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Abstract 
Since institutions include not only governmental and civic organizations and 
regulations, but also social customs and behavior, the post-transition development can 
not be analyzed or understood without the heritage of the past. All-encompassing state-
ownership, monopolization and elimination of all kinds of competition reached 
unprecedented proportions in the Soviet-type economies, creating oligarchic 
organizations, mentalities, and behavioral patterns. The ruling communist elite enjoyed 
extreme privileges; citizens became much more alienated from the state than in 
democratic societies.  
Experiences of the fastest growing countries proved that by reforming the 
institutional system and the policy-regime the growth potential of an economy can be 
much better exploited and catching-up with the more developed countries can be faster. 
Because of the “velvet” character of transition in East Central Europe, many of the old 
special interest organizations were not destroyed, thus creating obstacles to faster 
growth and structural change. In the catch-up process much depends on the openness of 
an economy, however its performance is basically determined endogenously, by the 
allocation of resources and their efficient use depending on the institutional structure. 
The lack or weakness of the rule of the law is one of the main obstacles to the 
economic catching-up of the East Central European societies and their accession to the 
European Union. The share of the shadow economy in the transition countries increased 
very substantially and is about twice as big as in developed market economies. 
Increased criminal activities and large-scale tax-avoidance is closely related to 
corruption and is very damaging for the lawful and secure environment of growth. 
Corruption is strongly negatively associated with the investment rate, and through this it 
lowers the rate of growth. Clientelistic networks evolved around the political parties, 
creating a social network where political loyalty prevails against market relations, 
democratic decision making, and professionalism in public administration. In the 
political struggles, the question was not only which political group would govern the 
country, but also who would privatize the vast quantity of state assets, and to whom. In 
clientelist regimes corruption, favoritism, partiality, give-and-take, and nepotism 
abound, and thus democratic morale and the logic of the market is destroyed. 
The analysis shows that the institutions in place in most of the East Central 
European countries are suitable to achieve a faster growth rate than the EU average, 
thus catching-up in the not too distant future seems probable after accession. However, 
the deficiencies in the rule of law are seriously hindering the full utilization of the 
growth potential of these economies. 
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Foreword 
by János Gács 
 
This paper is one of the results of a broad, multi-year research project of the 
Economic Transition and Integration  Project of IIASA entitled “Catching Up and EU 
Accession – Prospects for First and Second Wave Countries”. The research was 
particularly encouraged by IIASA’s Swedish and Hungarian national member 
organizations, while financial support was provided by the (then) Swedish national 
member organization, the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research 
(FRN). Preparations for the project started in 1999. In addition to other forms of 
communication two workshops, one in Budapest in January 2000, and one in Stockholm 
in May 2001, helped to elaborate the research agenda, coordinate collaborative work 
and discuss results. Publication of the studies prepared in the framework of this projects 
started in September 2001. 
The main ideas of the research project can be summarized as follows. 
The accession of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to the EU is 
likely to lead to conflicts between these countries and the incumbent members unless 
there is a rapid narrowing of the gap in per capita incomes between them. The CEECs 
are much poorer and have proportionately much larger agricultural sectors than the 
average EU country, and their combined populations make up between one-fourth and 
one-third of that of the current EU. Due to these characteristics there is concern in  EU 
member states about a mass migration from the East following accession, about social 
and environmental “dumping” from CEECs, and about an increased demand by the 
CEECs on the EU's Structural and Cohesion Funds, as well as on the funds provided 
under the Common Agricultural Policy. 
These concerns, however, are counterbalanced to a large degree by a “catching 
up” predicted by both theory and experience: poorer countries, unless their development 
is impeded by institutional barriers, usually develop faster than richer ones, and there is 
a tendency toward convergence in levels of GDP per capita. In recent years, this 
catching up process seems to have started. In addition, trends in capital inflows and 
stock market developments suggest that the expected return on capital in the region is 
sufficiently high to support the buildup of stronger production capacities. 
The research project on catching up studied the pattern according to which 
preparations for membership can trigger changes that will affect the growth process 
before and after membership. Special attention was paid to CEECs in different 
positions: those that started negotiations in 1998 and may reach membership first, and 
those that started negotiations in 2000. The effects on the sources of growth in both the 
pre-accession and post-accession periods were studied. 
 v
The following specific topics were investigated by the contributors of the 
project: the relevance of the export led East Asian development experience for CEECs; 
the forces of convergence and divergence that worked in the less developed EU member 
states (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) following their accession; the mixed 
experience of East Germany in catching up in a growth theoretic perspective; the role of 
domestic savings and savings behavior in the catch-up process; the likely pattern of the 
so-called Balassa-Samuelson process (real appreciation associated with the expected 
rapid productivity growth) in the course of the convergence; evaluation of the possible 
effects of EU structural aid on the candidate countries' development based on the  
experience of the cohesion countries of the EU; financial convergence of the candidate 
countries to the EU and the growth process; the role of institutions in the process of 
transition and catching up; and the relationship between the growth process and human 
development (health, education, standard of living, including inequality) in the context 
of EU accession. 
 
 vi
About the Author 
András Nagy is honorary researcher at the Institute of Economics Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. In 2000-2001 he participated in the research project „Catching 
Up and EU Accession – Prospects for First and Second Wave Countries” of the ETI 
project of IIASA. 
 
 
 1
Evolving Institutions and Catching-up by the Candidate 
Countries of the EU 
 
András Nagy 
Introduction 
The role of institutions and their evolution in the transition process of Central 
and Eastern Europe to a market economy has been a neglected subject, both in 
theoretical discussions and in the practice of economic policy. It was widely believed 
that adopting institutions similar to those found in developed market economies would 
be a relatively simple process and would solve the problems of technological 
backwardness and economic inefficiency in a short period of time. The past ten years 
have showed not only that these are  by no means simple tasks, but also that the 
development and the significant structural changes in the transition countries have very 
divergent results. More attention seems to be focused recently on the role of institutions 
and their changes in explaining what really happened and why, and what should be done 
to accelerate the catching-up process and the European integration of the transition 
countries. 
There is no break in history and especially not in economic development, and 
the transition from the communist one-party rule to a pluralistic democratic society, and 
from the non-competitive, planned economic system to a market economy did not start 
with a blank page. Past, present and future are linked by the evolution of institutions, by 
their creation and disappearance, by their changing motivations, by their conservative, 
adaptive or resilient features, which strongly influence the structural and productivity 
changes, the dynamics of economic and social development. 
Most people understand institutions to be government agencies, private, or civil 
organizations, courts, etc. However, in fact, the scope of institutions is much larger1. As 
North (1990, p. 3.) defined it: “ Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” 
According to Schotter (1981, p. 11.) they include not only the legal and governmental 
structures and regulations, but the different interest organizations and the regularity in 
social behavior that specifies action in recurrent situations. Hare (2000, p. 5.) gave a 
definition of institutions by listing four characteristic features: “(a) they regulate 
economic behavior in ways which, in the short run, often conflict with individual 
preferences; (b) they are based on shared expectations, derived from custom, trust, legal 
provisions, etc.; (c) they make most sense if the economy is thought of as a “repeated 
game” in which most types of transaction occur many times; and (d) anonymity, in the 
sense that the functioning of a given institution should not be dependent upon the 
identity of the economic agents seeking to conduct the types of transaction to which this 
institution relates.”  
                                                 
1
 There are many definitions and interpretations of institutions and there is an ongoing debate 
about it. Without going into the details, I intend only to clarify briefly, in what sense this term 
will be used in this study. 
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Institutions can be formal or informal, as laws and regulations, or customs and 
conventions of behavior. They include both what citizens are prohibited from doing, as 
well as what they are permitted or compelled to undertake. These regulations strongly 
influence the performance of the economy, as they affect the costs of transaction and 
transformation. The state has an important and necessary role of creating institutions. If 
this is missing, or the institutions are weak to enforce regulations, private sector can 
intervene, but in such cases, they frequently serve special interests, like coercing debtors 
to pay or demanding “award for protection”. 
While the existence of institutions (versus an anarchic situation) stabilizes 
human interaction both in economic, political and cultural sense, they are not constant: 
laws, regulations, contracts, codes of conduct, and the organizations, authorities they 
embody, are evolving, as they all are human creations. Institutional change has widely 
different forms: laws and regulations can suddenly be modified by judicial decisions, 
government departments can be invented or abolished, while customs and traditions 
change slowly in an incremental fashion. This characteristic is very important when the 
development of the transition countries is studied. As behavioral patterns are strongly 
and traditionally imbedded in the society, they change more incrementally than in a 
discontinuous way. This is true even in the case of sudden or radical change, such as 
revolutions or the collapse of political regimes. The continuity of informal constraints 
links the past to the future, and can explain many features of the development processes.  
To catch-up the East Central European economies need well-functioning 
markets, but these are at least as much the outcome as the condition of economic 
development. As Lazonick (2001) pointed out, the society must first put in place the 
institutions that generate well functioning markets to reap the advantages of them. Then, 
additional institutions are needed to control the operation of markets to achieve stable 
and equitable economic growth. 
 
1. Heritage of the past 
It was a great surprise how fast and relatively peacefully the communist one-
party rule and the non-competitive, planned economic system in Central and Eastern 
Europe collapsed. At the beginning, this created a widespread feeling of liberation and 
euphoria linked to great expectations of political democracy, pluralism and the 
introduction of an efficient market economy. Equally unexpectedly, the mood of the 
population significantly worsened in a short period, as general disillusionment resulted 
from unrealized expectations. Resistance to change became much stronger, as economic 
conditions deteriorated considerably. It is highly probable that the unforeseen character 
of the developments in these cases was closely related to the lack of understanding of 
the nature, interests and resilience of institutions.  
It was generally recognized that a widespread and deep economic and social 
crisis preceded the sudden collapse of the Soviet-type system. The symptoms of this 
crisis were well known and discussed in literature: low efficiency, declining rates of  
productivity improvement, slow technical progress and adaptability, slowing growth or 
stagnation, deterioration of living conditions (especially of the environment), shortages 
of all kinds simultaneously with wastefulness and squandering, a strong decline in work 
morale, etc. However, the deeper causes, the more fundamental layer of reasons for the 
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conspicuous failure of the former system were not recognized, and the reasons why the 
reform efforts were unsuccessful were not well understood.  
There was a long period of preparation for the collapse of the regimes in East 
Central Europe, during which nearly all the experts of socialist societies made a great 
error of judgment: confusing immobility, resistance to change with stability. The 
stubborn resistance to reforms, the conspicuous immobility of these regimes, was 
viewed as stability, while it created a self-destructive instability. The stronger the 
resistance to change became, the more stability declined. Institutions changed 
considerably over the decades, but even if the reforms introduced in certain countries 
brought improvements in many fields, much of this change, against the expectations of 
the party leaderships, went in the wrong direction: instead of curing the imperfections of 
the system, the reforms aggravated them2. 
Very unexpectedly, the Soviet-type systems collapsed relatively peacefully, in 
most cases without the bloodshed, civil wars, or violent revolutions associated with 
comparable radical changes in the past3. The political, economic, military and cultural 
elite of the old regime not only abstained in most cases from open and violent 
resistance, but a significant part of the “nomenklatura” actively co-operated in the 
demolition of the old system. This shows the importance of institutional and mentality 
changes within the communist leaderships. There were obviously many factors causing 
the fall of the East Central European regimes under Soviet domination. It can be rightly 
assumed, however, that transformation of the institutional structure, the system of 
incentives, interests and values of the dominating political and managerial elite played 
an important role in the collapse of the system4. Without understanding the process of 
this change, one can not explain the slowness and difficulties of the transition itself, 
much less the likely direction of it. 
It seems evident that the communist organizations and their leaderships, which 
at the end of the 1980s helplessly and sometimes even willingly surrendered their power 
to the democratic opposition, bore little resemblance to those communists who had 
violently seized power forty years before. The communist elite evolved from the period 
of armed resistance against Nazism and occupation during World War II, through the 
short-lived democratic period when they monopolized power and overturned the legal 
parliamentary systems, to the period of Stalinist dictatorship and terrorist oppression of 
the population. During this time, they remained nevertheless, permeated by a 
revolutionary ideology, with hatred against all values and attitudes seen as "bourgeois".  
                                                 
2
 For the evaluation of the reforms see  Chavance (1994), Kornai (1986), Nagy (1989, 1991). 
3
 There are a lot of different explanations of the collapse, a good review of them can be found in 
Lavigne (1995). 
4
 According to Csanádi (1997 p. 306.) “common features and their behavioral consequences in 
the functioning of party-state systems, while providing the structure’s self-supporting 
mechanism, also simultaneously form the traps which eventually lead to their disintegration and 
collapse.” According to Solnick (1998) institutional collapse was a consequence of the erosion 
of supervision within and above the organizations to such an extent that the individual decision-
makers were not prevented in pursuing a behavior that internally undermined the credibility and 
functioning the institutions themselves.  
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Rise of interest organizations 
In the late 1940s when the communists seized total control in Eastern Europe, 
their economic policy was very flexible. Central management quickly adapted to the 
new conditions of sudden, extreme expropriation and nationalization of private 
property, rapid industrialization and forcible modernization, the confiscation of recently 
distributed land from peasant farmers and its collectivization etc. Later, however, 
rigidity, conservatism, and resistance to change and adaptation gradually became 
prevalent. A significant part of this development can be explained by Olson`s theory of 
interest groups5. In the first period after the war, with the destruction of the political 
structure of the pro-Nazi regimes, most former special-interest organizations and 
distributional coalitions were eliminated. Consequently, the new organizations had a 
strongly encompassing nature, representing a relatively large segment of the society. 
The weak or non-existent interest organizations could not resist the introduction of 
radical structural changes in the society and economy. Subsequently, however, a gradual 
change could be observed: economic and political organizations, state and local 
bureaucracies as well as political organizations, including the communist party itself, 
evolved more and more into special-interest organizations and collusions, losing their 
encompassing character. By eliminating competition monopolies were created to an 
unprecedented extent in industry and services, as it was the adequate organizational 
structure of central planning and management. Agricultural co-operatives lost their 
collective and democratic characteristics and merged in large land estates. A strongly 
protectionist, autarkic trade policy effectively subsidized both import substitution and  
certain exports. To get rid of the threat of competition was of course consistent with the 
interests of the remaining industrial, agricultural and service enterprises, as evidenced 
by the almost complete absence of resistance to these measures. The "smooth" transition 
to the Soviet-type system was of course the consequence of brutal intimidation and 
terror, but one should not underestimate the microeconomic interests linked to 
monopolization and protectionism. 
As the distributional struggle for resources increased, these special-interest 
organizations became powerful lobbies, and more attention was paid to grabbing a 
larger slice of the pie than to enlarging the pie. By fighting for funds for unprofitable 
investments, by lobbying for subsidies, favorable prices, high wages, large bonuses for 
managers and big Soviet contracts for outdated, low-quality products, they could obtain 
a larger slice but at the cost of reducing the size of the pie (i.e. the GDP). 
As the original hierarchical structure of the socialist economies evolved into a 
network of interest groups, a distributional struggle developed, showing the relative 
power of these groups. The strongest, the military lobby usually received first priority 
over resources, mining and heavy industry came second, followed by the other sectors 
of the economy — while education, health-care and environmental concerns were in 
most cases in a much weaker position6. 
                                                 
5
 See Olson (1965), (1982), and (1991). 
6
 In Soviet-type societies the indicators of education and heath-care were relatively high 
(compared to their economic development) for ideological and political reasons. However, the 
endowment and quality of these services was low because of the weaknesses of the institutions 
representing them. 
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The extremely rigid terrorist period of Stalin’s rule ended in the middle of the 
1950s, when a widespread discontent was expressed by uprisings and revolutions in 
East Central Europe as a reaction to foreign oppression and to the institutional structure 
forced upon them. This created a turning point in the evolution of these societies. In 
different degrees and forms, the extreme political rigidity was eased. To avoid popular 
uprisings a compromise was sought, both with the population and with the major 
western powers. The search for a compromise became manifest in the mid-sixties in the 
interaction of the changing institutional structure and the mentalities of the top 
administrators and managers. The excessive centralization and monopolization soon 
created its antidote: the necessity of decentralization. Both "rationality" and the 
convenience of planning has required the elimination of parallelisms and competition. 
However, these huge centralized institutions soon started to live according to their own 
rules and interests; they realized their strength and indispensability and became 
reluctant to accept the orders "from above". With the gradual strengthening of these 
monopolies, central planning and management evolved more into a bargaining process, 
aimed at compromise between the central authorities, the monopolies and other 
(cultural, military, health, regional etc.) institutions. 
Institutional changes strongly affected the attitude of those representing them: 
the managers of big state-owned firms, for example, stopped regarding themselves as 
obedient executors of central orders, and started to present and defend the interest of 
their enterprises, both against the central authorities and against each other. Top 
managers started to grab more and more rights, including certain features of property 
rights7. The changes in mentality and growing consciousness influenced and 
strengthened the institutional changes, which in turn had repercussions in the attitude of 
the representatives of the institutions. This interaction between mentality changes and 
institutional changes was self-reinforcing. The changing attitudes of managerial circles 
later, after transition started played a very important role to support the managers 
shaping the privatization process, economic policies and the regulatory and legal 
environment for their own advantage. 
These gradual transformations during the communist era were closely related to 
the successes and failures of the economic and institutional reforms. Looking back at 
what have been, and what have not been implemented among the reform proposals, it 
seems that it was not rational considerations, but rather the interests and influence of top 
managers that prevailed. Beside the resistance of the political establishment, the 
willingness of top managers to change certain aspects of  centralized planning and 
management, and resist to others, can explain the destiny of partial reforms and the final 
failure of “market socialism”. The managers favored the reduction of central 
interventions and detailed mandatory planning, and the extension of enterprises’ 
autonomy, without losing their protection both from domestic and foreign competition. 
They knew well the weak competitiveness of their firms and products and resisted to be 
forced to increase productivity, improve the quality of their products or to better satisfy 
their customers. 
                                                 
7
 The right to use property by the managers gradually was extended to get certain benefits from 
the assets and the right to transform them. However, to sell or to buy assets was not granted to 
them before the transition started. See  Pejovich (1990) and Major (1993). 
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Privileges and changing mentalities 
In the process of decentralization and monopolization of the Central Eastern 
European economies, one could observe the first signs of significant mentality changes: 
a wider acceptance of so-called middle-class values was gradually taking place. The 
demands to replace dictatorial rule, the hierarchical dependence on the powers „above” 
with more independence for the firms and with their mutual interdependence were signs 
of these. These were linked to the demand to replace the centrally regulated egalitarian 
income policy with salaries and bonuses based on economic performance, both for the 
managers and for the employees. Influential groups of economic managers used their 
increased autonomy to extend their power and wealth. Their values and attitudes 
differed more and more from the revolutionaries fighting for communist ideas; the 
managers paid lip-service to Marxism-Leninism, and showed loyalty to the communist 
party, but in fact their motivations were very different. Income differences between the 
managers and top bureaucrats on the one hand, and other employees, on the other, were 
growing fast, and fringe benefits were increasing even faster8. The privileges of the 
nomenklatura were extended to special import licenses, foreign travels, scholarships and 
work permits in western countries, etc. 
The top leaders of the communist regimes always enjoyed extreme privileges, 
but at the beginning, only a relatively small circle was lavishly favored. With the 
institutional changes mentioned above, the privileged nomenklatura was significantly 
extended and the income differences considerably increased. As ideological conviction 
and commitment diminished, communist party leaders realized that loyalty could be 
bought for money and power. This led to the development of clientelistic networks 
linking managers of large enterprises and collective farms, as well as  officials of 
regional authorities supporting each-other in power and career building.  
In the last two decades of communist rule, in several of these countries, 
significant personal wealth could be legally accumulated. In addition to the fast growing 
salaries and fringe benefits of the nomenklatura, the opportunities for enrichment by 
corruption, peculation, and stealing became widespread. Legal persecution of these 
crimes diminished and mutual indulgence increased among members of the higher 
echelon of the nomenklatura.  
Private rent seeking was one of the main sources of accumulation of personal 
wealth under communism. As Dobrinsky (2001) pointed out: “since all productive 
assets were nominally owned by the anonymous state while control was always specific 
and individualized, there was ample room for extraction of private rents in the state-
owned enterprise sector”. Rent seeking was widespread in the allocation of benefits or 
in access to goods and services in short supply.  
Legally, and illegally accumulated wealth could be multiplied when and where 
certain private economic activities were authorized. Licenses for private shops, 
restaurants and other profitable small businesses were obtainable through "good 
connections", which meant more or less open corruption on the one hand, and profitable 
investment possibilities on the other. As these private businesses needed capital, and 
could not obtain it on the non-existent financial market, the savings of the nomenklatura 
could be profitably laundered in the more or less legal businesses. 
                                                 
8
 See  Kertesi and Galasi (1987). 
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Another important aspect of the privileges the communist rulers and party 
members enjoyed was that they were in many cases beyond the rule of the law. While 
there were extremely severe punishments for ordinary citizens for minor thefts of “state 
property”, party members, and especially higher-ranking officials were not, or very 
rarely condemned for corruption or fraud. Even criminal cases, such as killing a 
pedestrian in a car accident, were covered up and the offender was not brought to trial if 
he/she happened to be a minister or politburo member or a relative of these. Police 
officers, attorneys, and judges learned that they had to make a distinction according to 
party membership, or the rank of officials, both in the process of investigation and 
judgment. The fact that even after transition, politicians and higher-ranking civil 
servants are treated differently by the police and the courts is an unfortunate heritage of 
the past. Equality of rights and the indisputable rule of the law are not evident in the 
East Central European countries; it has to be learned and enforced. 
One should not forget that in most of these countries, pluralistic democratic 
traditions could never develop, and there was no tradition of equal rights. On the 
contrary, respect and even submission to authority, servility was widespread, a 
traditional and rational choice for a large part of the population. While it was expected 
that citizens respect the law, the wealthy, the powerful and the state could violate it 
without consequence long before the communist regimes. It is no surprise that following 
the collapse of such unequal and hierarchical systems, unlawful, Mafia-type 
organizations developed much more easily than democratic organizations and behavior 
based on the respect of law. 
Corruption and enrichment of a significant part of the nomenklatura can be 
morally condemned, and could have been legally prosecuted, but it did have a positive 
side that made the system more supportable. The dictatorial rule of fanatic communists 
was far crueler for the population than the more liberal rule of those who cared for their 
own comfort and wealth, or who were corrupt. Changes in mentality and in behavior 
were closely related to a generation change within the nomenklatura as the "old guard" 
communists gradually retired and a new generation with a craving for power replaced 
them. They were pragmatic, regarded themselves as technocrats and reformists, and 
started to question fundamental dogmas of the socialist system, including those 
regarding property rights9. 
If middle-class values impregnated the communist leaders, it was even more 
prevalent in the society at large. The prescribed model of restraint from private 
consumption and wealth holding went against the very nature of human behavior. 
Hence it could be noted that in the final days of communism, “bourgeois” behavior 
prevailed in a great part of the society, especially among the growing quasi-middle 
class. 
The fact that the collapse of the communist regimes happened relatively 
peacefully was strongly related to the changes in mentality and attitude mentioned. The 
need for a capitalist transformation emerged within the socialist system, and not only in 
the private sector or on the lower levels of the society, but at the ruling levels too. 
Managers of state-owned firms and other members of the nomenklatura with 
entrepreneurial spirit realized that their status, position, knowledge, and network enable 
                                                 
9
 See Olson (1992). 
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them to keep or extend their leading role in business and politics, and to increase their 
wealth. 
 
Alienation from the state 
A paradoxical phenomenon could be observed in the first half of the twentieth 
century: while the role and spending of the state had increased very significantly and the 
authorities with their regulations pried more and more into the lives of the citizens, the 
state became more alienated from the citizens. This was a general tendency in Europe, 
but it was much more the case in the East Central European countries, where state 
ownership and control extended not only to the units of production and services, but 
also to every other field of life: education, health care, pensions, culture, trade unions, 
professional, social and even religious activity. It may seem rather peculiar: the more a 
state spreads its power and controlling activity, the more alien and remote it becomes 
for its own citizens and taxpayers.  
The "paternalistic" socialist states of East Central Europe of the 1970s and 1980s 
developed from Stalin’s totalitarian party-state of the pre-war period. Its peculiarity is 
that nothing can restrain or control its power. The totalitarian party state can confiscate 
or nationalize any assets, arrest or execute anyone without explanation, collect as much 
tax as it wants, enact laws and violate them without consequence, regroup investments, 
control all information, support or ban different scientific or artistic endeavors, etc. As 
most of the East Central European countries were militarily occupied by the Soviet 
Army, the state authorities were regarded by a great part of the population as the agents 
of a foreign oppressive power. It was well known that these despotic regimes could 
control and dictate all aspects of life. All but one: it could not deprive humans of their 
inner freedom; there was no way to force love and devotion toward the totalitarian 
party-state.  
In the last three decades, the development of the East Central European countries 
can be described as their gradual relinquishing of several characteristics of the 
totalitarian state. Decentralization of power, rise and strengthening of special interest 
groups, increasing role of the market, granting of some human rights and legal security, 
acknowledgement of a limited autonomy of consumers, and more liberal cultural 
politics, all meant the gradual relinquishing of the totalitarian state. In this sense, state 
authorities became more tolerable for the citizens. Nevertheless, the alienation 
remained; the majority of the population still did not regard the state as their own. The 
citizens rejoiced in every little easing of the dictatorial hold, every step that reduced 
their defenselessness, increased legal security, human rights, and the autonomy of 
consumers. However, even if the state became somewhat less hostile and oppressive, it 
was well known that in the communist one-party regime no liberalization, 
decentralization or law extension was irreversible; the system could easily become 
unmerciful again, as it did several times. 
With free parliamentary elections and the establishment of democratic political 
institutions, the disposition toward the state changed significantly; at least for a while. 
With liberation from the Soviet rule, regaining independence and self-government, the 
support of institutional change prevailed. However, as the consolidation of the new 
regimes did not meet the expectations of the citizens, for it brought previously unknown 
large unemployment and real-wage decline, the alienation toward the state returned. 
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Another important factor contributed to this development, something usually called 
“state desertion”. Partly due to a naïve belief in market automatisms (strengthened by 
Western mainstream policy advisers), the inevitable reduction of the role of state was 
realized as an abrupt and drastic withdrawal of the state from the protection and support 
of a large segment of the society. State institutions are still regarded as external or 
superior authorities, and it is generally not expected that they serve the common interest 
or the well being of the population. The citizens slowly learn that they have rights, and 
how to use them, but trust towards the state has not really developed. 
The ingredients of this process were not only the experiences of the past, the 
slowness of changes in mentalities, and the self-defense of the overgrown authorities, 
but presumably also the intentions of the political leaders. They do not encourage 
voters, taxpayers and consumers, the civil society, to take part in decision making. It is a 
particular feature of the dictatorial systems that, not only in the ruling circle, but also in 
the elite of the opposition, an “enlightened” view emerges. According to this, the elite 
knows better what is best for the “masses”, than the citizens do themselves, because the 
“consciousness of the masses is underdeveloped”, or the population has previously been 
“manipulated” by the dictatorial rule. This world-redeeming view of the “enlightened” 
politicians did not deter them from thinking of themselves as great democrats, but did 
hold them back from truly striving to get to know and consider the desires and will of 
the citizens.   
The long run increase of the share of state budget in the GDP is a world-wide 
phenomenon. It increased on average from 8 per cent to 20 per cent between 1870 and 
1960 - mainly in association with the two World Wars10. In the following 34 years, it 
grew to 40%. In the ex-communist countries, the proportion of state redistribution was 
comparable only to that of the Scandinavian countries, which have the highest welfare 
expenditure. A great difference between the two groups of countries was that the level 
of GDP per capita in the communist world was only a small fraction of the level in the 
Scandinavian countries11. This redistribution reached an impassable level, the tax level 
could not be increased, and the budget deficit became large and enduring. 
As was mentioned above, the strongly centralized hierarchical system slowly 
changed into a complex combination of monopolized special interest groups, but this 
process did not ease the alienation of the state. However, the only shield the citizens or 
consumers could count on against the ruthless behavior of the monopolies were the 
central authorities. No interest group represented their rights, only the central authorities 
raised barriers eventually to price increases, deterioration in quality, and pollution. The 
growing power of state monopolies significantly reduced the efficiency of the economy. 
When neither the central authorities nor the market has a strong influence on the 
management, it is the best solution for the enterprises, and the worst for the consumers. 
As the state was the proprietor of all assets, it was reluctant to be “harsh” with “its” 
enterprises; it was difficult to harden their budget constraints, or decrease the subsidies 
to them. However, if the state were “soft” with its enterprises, it inevitably needed to be 
                                                 
10
 See  Tanzi, V. and Schuknecht, L. (1995). 
11
 The share of state redistribution is, in fact, not directly comparable due to differences in the 
statistical systems, and because of various kinds of subsidies (price subsidies, support to loss-
making enterprises) in the socialist system. 
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“harsh” with the consumers, who suffered from shortage, poor quality, and inferior 
services.  
The majority of the population, probably in part unconsciously, understood this 
problem. This may be the reason why, following the start of the transition process, the 
population, without fully knowing the consequences, accepted the idea of privatization, 
or at least did not resist it. If they had regarded the state’s property to be their own, or 
the community’s, they would have surely protested against the dispossession of “their” 
assets. They realized that they had no right to the state’s property, and saw how 
inefficiently and wastefully the state dealt with it. The will to be freed from the rule and 
political power of the communist party therefore became intertwined with the will to be 
freed from the alienated totalitarian state and its property. 
It was a very important, but little analyzed feature of the Soviet-type systems 
that the extremely large-scale taxation seemingly didn’t exist, or at least stayed invisible 
to the population. There was no, or very little, personal income tax. Invoices did not 
show the size of sales tax, contributions to the pension and health care systems were 
paid by the employers, and their size was unknown to the beneficiaries. This was a 
perfectly adequate system for a dictatorship: the state could tax as much as it wanted, 
while the taxes remained “invisible”. Thus tax payments were not linked to state 
expenditures and social insurance benefits. This produced the impression that the 
employees do not give anything, while they, and their family members, received a lot: 
education, housing, police protection, health care, courts, hospitals, pensions, holiday 
resorts, subsidized consumer goods, etc. Where the state got the money from to cover 
all these expenses remained obscure. This seemed to be a real “provident state”, which 
generously offered many things, and asked little or no payment in return.  
If the citizens do not pay taxes, it is obvious that they have no right to intervene 
in how the state spends “its” money. They should only praise, and not criticize the state 
and its leaders. The seemingly invisible tax system had – over a long period – created a 
mentality which is very different from democratic societies where the citizens may 
know how much tax and social insurance contributions they have to pay, and 
consequently have a high stake in how it is spent. One should add that even after the 
transition, many politicians and civil servants prefer a system where neither the citizens 
nor their different interest groups influence or decide the level of taxation or the state 
budget. This is partly because they think they know better how money should be spent, 
and partly since this would reduce their power. 
After reviewing the heritage of several aspects of the dictatorial one-party 
systems and centralized planned economies, let us see now how the inherited and newly 
created institutions influence the catching-up process of the transition countries. 
 
2. Institutions and catching-up 
There is a large and fast expanding literature on how institutions help or hinder 
growth in general, and the catching-up process in particular. In this section we intend to 
review what can be learnt from previous investigations from the point of view of the 
East Central European countries’ EU accession. First, we discuss some aspects of the 
historical precedents and then the findings of empirical investigations of the effect of 
institutions and governance on economic integration and growth.  
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The post war growth miracle 
The catch-up problem of the East Central European economies shows certain 
similarities to the post World War II situation of the West-European countries, when a 
wide gap had opened, in comparison both with the US and with Europe’s pre-war 
development patterns. After the nearly two decades of depression and war efforts, 
between the two World Wars,  starting with 1950  a quarter century of Golden Age 
appeared in Western Europe, when economic growth was nearly twice as rapid as over 
any comparable period before or since12. There are of course a number of explanations 
for this spectacular catch-up experience and it is intriguing to find out what their 
implications are for the transition economies. 
One of the first theoretical explanations of the fast growth rate of the post war 
period was offered by Jánossy (1966), who stressed that rapid economic development is 
not finished with reconstruction, when the pre-war level is reached. It continues until 
the long-term trend is attained, corresponding to the level of development which could 
have been achieved without the intervention of the war. He assumed a significant 
stability and smoothness of the growth process, linked to the expanding knowledge and 
adaptability of the work force.  
According to Eichengreen (1996), one of the main causes of Europe’s post-war 
growth miracle was the exceptionally high rate of investment, which was nearly twice 
as big in the fifties and sixties as before the war13. According to the author, the 
conditions for this was provided by wage moderation and fast export growth. Wage 
moderation stimulated both the demand for and the supply of investment: demand - by 
making investments profitable, supply - by making profits available to finance those 
investments. The fast developing openness of European economies increased the growth 
of trade, which was more than eight per cent a year in the 1950s and 1960s. Rapidly 
growing investment and trade allowed capital to be allocated to the sectors where its 
contribution to productivity was the greatest.  
Both of these characteristics were in direct opposition to the experiences of the 
inter-war period, when exports stagnated and wage pressure was intense. The question 
is: what kind of institutional structure developed and made it possible that wage 
moderation and the expansion of international trade could take place? 
In Eichengreen’s opinion, what happened in Western Europe was similar to the 
dynamic game model of Lancaster (1973) and van der Ploeg (1987), where welfare is 
maximized when capital and labor agree to defer current compensation in return for 
future gains. Workers moderate their wage claims in order to let enterprises make 
profits and invest in capacity modernization and expansion with a view of future 
profitability. Capitalists restrain dividend payout in order to increase investments, which 
stimulates growth, raising future incomes.  
                                                 
12
 According to Eichengreen’s (1966) calculations [based on Crafts (1992) and Boltho (1982)] 
the unweighted average growth rate for eight European countries was 4.4 per cent in 1950–73, 
but only 2.4 per cent in 1922-37 and 2.3 per cent in 1979-88. 
13
 Maddison (1976) estimated the rate of investment in Western Europe rising from 9.6 per cent 
of GDP in 1920-38 to 16.8 per cent in 1950-70. 
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The cooperative equilibrium can be maintained, however, only if there are 
credible institutional arrangements which bind capitalists to invest and workers to 
exercise wage restraint. The social and economic institutions developed in Western 
Europe after World War II, the welfare state, can be regarded as a mechanism to enforce 
such an agreement14. Institutions were developed to monitor the compliance of 
capitalists and to disseminate evidence of non-cooperation. Social contracts between 
labor, management, and government — including wage and price controls, 
unemployment, health-care, and retirement programmes — were used to pre-commit 
unions to wage moderation.  
The expansion of trade required new international institutions to further 
coordination and commitment. It was essential for the European governments in the 
post-war catch-up process to be convinced that their partners’ commitment of gradual 
trade liberalization was permanent15. An important factor of export oriented 
development was that both governments and business executives had to be convinced 
that import tariffs would be gradually lowered, and no return to protectionism would 
take place. 
There were great differences between countries in how similar “social 
partnership” agreements were attained in the fifties. The North-European countries — 
including Germany and Austria — were more successful in establishing such 
cooperative arrangements, which included linking wage demands to productivity 
increases in return for a management pledge to stimulate the latter. In several countries, 
profit taxation encouraged investments, and in return for wage restraint, full 
employment and higher future incomes were offered. In France, the UK and Italy, labor 
militancy and wage pressure remained strong in the fifties, and therefore efforts to cut 
similar bargains succeeded only in the subsequent decade. Consequently, higher 
investment and growth rates could be observed with a delay.  
What was new in these cooperative institutional arrangements was that unions 
and employers’ associations exchanged information on wage and investment decisions 
to monitor and disseminate evidence of compliance or non-compliance with the terms of 
the agreement. In certain countries, they included the compulsory representation of 
labor unions on advisory and administrative committees of industry and government.  
 
Destruction of special interest organizations  
Another theory offering an explanation of the great differences in economic 
performance in different countries and historical periods is Olson’s model of collective 
choice already outlined in section 1. According to this theory, organizations for 
collective action with narrow constituencies have uniquely perverse incentives, and in 
stable societies, many such organizations accumulate, over time, decreasing economic 
                                                 
14
 Such an arrangement is called “class compromise” by Przeworski and Wallerstein (1982), 
where some institutions make it reasonably certain that wages increase as a function of profits. 
In Boyer’s (1988) definition, this is “Fordism”, a cooperative structure of industrial relations, in 
which an equitable division of productivity gains is reached with a prominent role of 
government intervention. 
15
 The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Payments Union, by creating an 
efficient monitoring system, contributed significantly to a credible commitment mechanism.  
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efficiency and dynamism. Revolutionary upheavals, totalitarian repression, and foreign 
occupation destroy organizations for collective action. If such a catastrophe has 
destroyed many of the special interest organizations, economic growth will be, for a 
time, extraordinarily rapid. 
The most remarkable examples of economic growth in previous centuries justify 
in certain respects this theory. The growth of Germany in the period of the Zollverein 
and the unification of the country was extremely fast. The same thing can be said of 
Japan after the Meiji Restoration, the growth of the United States in the nineteenth 
century, of Holland during its Golden Age in the seventeenth century, and of Britain 
during the Industrial Revolution between 1760 and 1840. In all these cases, a 
jurisdictional integration took place, with a wider market, within which internal free 
trade developed, and very rapid economic growth could be observed. The establishment 
of new jurisdictions or governments undercut the guilds and other parochial lobbies, and 
it took a long time until larger scale interest organization influencing legislation could 
develop. 
The contrast between the economic development of Great Britain, Germany and 
Japan in the post World War II period underlines the validity of Olson’s theory16. While 
Great Britain produced the poorest economic performance of the major developed 
countries, Germany and Japan showed spectacular economic miracles. According to 
Olson, this was in great part due to the fact that Britain had the longest period of 
stability and immunity from invasion and institutional destruction, while the old 
organizational structures in the two defeated countries were almost totally eliminated. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, real per-capita income in Germany and Japan grew more than 
three times as fast as in the UK and USA.  
The creation of the European Common Market by the original six countries 
destroyed much of the distributional coalitions of the previously protectionist 
economies, providing a growth advantage as a consequence of integration. Per-capita 
income in France, Italy, and the Benelux countries grew at more than 4 per cent a year 
in the sixties, much faster than in the other OECD countries. 
An important message of Olson’s theory is that societies are not defenseless 
against the gradual development of the growing influence and power of lobbies and 
monopolies in stable conditions. Not only wars,  foreign occupations, or revolutions can 
eliminate them. Since narrow special-interest organizations represent only a tiny 
minority of the population,  in democratic societies, in principle, they can be outvoted. 
They can achieve their aims only because the majority does not notice or understand the 
harm they are causing to them. The last few decades in several countries have shown 
that market-opening and deregulatory reforms can greatly weaken the influence of 
cartels from both the business and the labor side. Deregulation of  lobby-intensive 
industries such as airlines, telephone, trucking, railroads, and communications could 
remove much of the economic irrationalities of these industries, which damaged the 
interests of the consumers. The harmful influence and power of tiny minorities can be 
defeated if the public wises up. Or as Olson has said: “No historical process that is 
understood, is inevitable”17.  
                                                 
16
 See  Olson (1996). 
17
 Ibid p. 92. 
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Quality of governance and catching up 
One of the most striking characteristics of economic development in the last 
decades was that while the underdeveloped countries as a whole have been falling 
further behind, a  few of them have grown much faster than the developed countries. 
The three fastest growing countries between 1985 and 1995 were all developing 
countries (China, Korea, and Thailand) and they grew on average more than twelve 
times as fast as the three countries with the highest per capita income (Canada, 
Switzerland, and the US)18. 
Factual world development thus contradicted the expectations of both 
neoclassical and endogenous growth theories. The neoclassical model assumes that 
there are diminishing returns to investment in physical and human capital, and predicts a 
general convergence of incomes and growth rates. The characteristic of endogenous 
growth models is, by contrast, constant or increasing returns to capital, and therefore the 
prediction of these models is consistent with underdeveloped economies remaining poor 
and with the observed divergence in per capita incomes. One explanation of why both 
the neoclassical and the endogenous growth theories are unable to account for the fact 
that the fastest growing countries are developing countries, and at the same time there is 
no tendency for general convergence, is that the quality of governance has been left out 
of both of them. This becomes particularly important in a more and more globalized 
economy, where capital flows and particularly FDI are favoring economies with 
competent governance. 
If economic performance depends strongly on differences in governance, then 
the utilization of opportunities will vary forcefully in different countries and in different 
periods. It can be assumed that poor countries achieve only a small fraction of their 
economic potential and they do not converge because of deficiencies in their 
governance. Institutions and policies usually change slowly, but they differ significantly 
between countries. Some of them, however, by radically reforming their institutional 
system and their economic policy regimes, i.e. with better governance, can exploit their 
exceptional growth opportunities for catching-up and grow much more rapidly than rich 
countries can. 
The results of both Keefer and Knack (1993, 1995) and Olson, Sarna and Swamy 
(1998) showed that better governance leads to higher rates of investment and is closely 
related to productivity growth19. They found that secure property rights not only 
encourage investments, but also the efficient allocation of factors of inputs. In response 
to threats of expropriation or repudiation of government contracts, entrepreneurs reduce 
investments, or invest in less specialized capital. Beyond the unfavorable static effects, 
this discourages dynamic gains from innovation, because  innovations are most likely to 
thrive when specialization is encouraged.  
In the studies mentioned above the measures of governance quality were taken 
from ICRG (1982), and in the case of Keefer and Knack also from BERI (1972), 
prepared by private firms to advise enterprises in foreign investment. They include the 
                                                 
18
 Source of data: WDR (1997). 
19
 See also: Knack (1996), Olson (1993), and Barro (1997). 
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risks of confiscation or forced nationalization; unilateral repudiation or change of the 
terms of contracts by governments; contract enforceability; the expertise of government 
administrations and their insulation from political pressures; the level of corruption; the 
authority of courts in implementing laws and adjudicating disputes; and the quality of 
infrastructure. The results of the regression analyses supported the hypothesis that the 
structure of incentives reflecting the institutions and economic policy regimes of a given 
country is a major determinant of the rate of growth in productivity and economic 
performance in general in the country. The studies concluded that political and civil 
liberties are insufficient proxies for the quality of the institutions that protect property 
rights. More direct indicators, however, proved to be crucial in explaining economic 
growth, the magnitude of investments, and the efficiency with which inputs are 
allocated and used.  
It can be concluded that low-income countries can catch up only if they have a 
sufficiently efficient institutional system and sound economic policy. The studies 
mentioned all inferred that convergence, or the lack thereof, could not be explained 
without considering the quality of institutions. There seems to be a general agreement 
that poor countries have a significant growth potential unused, but the tendency for 
them to grow faster holds only under certain conditions, depending especially on the 
level of governance.  
Theoretically it is possible to argue — along the line of the simultaneity bias of 
regression analysis — that the quality of governance is the result, rather than the cause, 
of productivity growth. However, the direction of causation is evident if we look into 
some of the major changes, or differences in economic growth. Comparing the 
performance of East and West Germany, North and South Korea, Mainland China and 
Hong Kong can not be attributed to preceding differences in income. Similarly, it was 
not prior growth of productivity, which led to the institutional and policy changes 
occurring in China with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, or when president Park 
Chung Hee replaced president Rhee Syngman in South Korea, or the changes of 
Kuomintang’s economic policy in Taiwan.  
 
Considerations of institutional development in East Central Europe 
Let us see now what conclusions can we draw from the theories and 
investigations mentioned above on the relations of institutions and the catching-up 
process for the East Central European countries preparing for their accession to the EU.  
Even if theoretically it would be possible, it seems to be far-fetched — following 
Jánossy’s arguments — to interpret the catching-up process of the transition economies 
as a “reconstruction” period until the level of development is attained which would have 
been achieved without the detour of the planned economy era. 
The conditions for a cooperative equilibrium between wage moderation by labor 
and commitment to invest their profits by capitalists are not existing in the East Central 
Europe countries, even if the concept of “social market economy” and “social 
partnership” got much publicity in political programs and debates. On the one hand, 
traditional trade unions lost much of their credibility as they served obediently the 
communist regimes, and have not found their new roles in the changing circumstances. 
The newly created democratic unions were in most cases (with the exception of Polish 
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Solidarity) too weak to make credible commitments. On the other hand, in the process 
of privatization, neither the employers’ associations nor the state were willing to reach, 
and even less to enforce, such an agreement.  
However, economic conditions in the transition countries in the early 1990s were 
not totally dissimilar from the post-war situation of Western Europe, and not only due to 
the relatively weak economic performance in both regions in the respective periods. In 
the transition countries, the level of wages (measured in US dollar or DEM) remained 
low, not because of labor restraining their claims, but mainly because of recession and 
widespread unemployment, and because of the devaluation of domestic currencies. Low 
wages contributed significantly to the attraction of foreign investments20 and to the 
successes of export growth, the two most important factors promoting the recovery of 
transition economies. Institutional changes such as privatization, and the liberalization 
of trade and capital flows were important factors of structural change (involving 
temporary unemployment), a necessary condition of economic growth. There is a lot to 
learn from the social compromise of the West European countries and of the role of the 
governments in reaching and keeping the agreements of the social partners. This is 
particularly important because the hardships of structural change, foreign competition, 
and gradual integration into the European markets may strengthen populist and 
protectionist tendencies and wage pressures, which can become serious obstacles to 
faster growth and catching-up. 
Due to the “velvet” character of East European transition many of the interest 
organizations that usually create obstacles to faster growth and structural change were 
not destroyed21. With the inflow of foreign capital and the growing role of multinational 
firms in East Central European economies, powerful new lobbies and pressure groups 
appeared and started to influence legislation and economic policies. Several of the 
multinational companies came to the East European markets and took part in the 
privatization process, not to compete with local or foreign firms, but to occupy and 
monopolies the local markets, resisting the development of competition. Governments 
were neither prepared to resist such monopolistic tendencies or to split the previous 
state-owned monopolies. In many cases, the buyers preferred to acquire local 
monopolies, moreover splitting, and selling these monopolies in pieces would have 
meant a surplus activity for the privatization agencies. Antitrust legislation was lacking, 
and it took time to develop institutions defending consumers’ interests.  
In contrast to the post second world war period, with the destruction and 
transformation of the communist political structure, many of the special interest 
organizations were not destroyed. In certain cases — most conspicuously in Russia — 
some of the monopolies actually became stronger and less restrained, as the state 
authorities were destroyed, and a power vacuum arose. 
The idea that monopolies are in most cases harmful, and competition is 
advantageous for the consumers, is in many respects new in Eastern Europe, which 
                                                 
20
 Relatively low wages are a necessary but not sufficient condition of FDI inflow. The ability to 
accommodate foreign capital is also a decisive factor, according to Hamar (2001). 
21
 As we will show below, a notable exception here were organizations that could have hindered 
the liberalization of trade: at the beginning of transition they were not existing or powerless, that 
is why trade liberalization in most countries could be accomplished relatively fast. 
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experienced a long period of excessive monopolization. A lot of effort is needed to 
understand that low productivity, misallocation, and misuse of resources is linked to 
monopolization of the markets. The defense of the interests of consumers, or the 
majority, needs not only the transformation of the role of government, but the 
development of civic organizations, the involvement of the media, as in many cases the 
consumers can not count on the support of the political parties. As we shall discuss 
later, widespread corruption both in legislation and in administration enables lobbies to 
resist the implementation of antitrust laws, or even to make loopholes in the laws 
themselves.  
The most important lesson, however, can be derived from the close relationship 
of the quality of governance and economic growth. The rule of law in general, and 
property rights, in particular, seem to be the cornerstone of the catching-up process and 
the integration of the East Central European countries. The implementation of the 
institutional changes needed in this respect is more difficult and time consuming than 
the necessary macroeconomic changes, like stabilization, liberalization, or the reduction 
of inflation22.  
 
Initial conditions 
Several research projects have found that the great variety of the results of the 
transition process from a planned to a market economy is closely related to their 
inherited and initial conditions from which they started. The path they follow depends 
strongly on the policies they choose, but this choice is also forcefully influenced by the 
past. There can be little doubt that the future of catching-up will be affected both by the 
initial conditions of institutions and the policies of institution creation and institutional 
change pursued in the last ten years. 
de Melo et al. (1997) studied in detail the role of initial conditions in the 
transition economies. They followed several previous studies focusing on the effects of 
policies, comparing the results of “big-bang” versus gradualism, and finding that the 
outcome is largely dependent on how macroeconomic stability was attained, and how 
fast the factors of production were transferred to efficient use. The unique feature of this 
research project  was, however, a systematic attempt  to analyze the interaction of 
factors, like initial conditions, political change and reforms in a unified framework 
comprising East Central Europe, the CIS countries, China and Vietnam. One group of 
indicators for initial conditions captured the different levels of development, resources 
and growth: such as urbanization, over-industrialization (i.e. repressed shares of trade, 
financial and consumer services) and abundance in natural resources. Another group of 
indicators intended to represent economic distortions and institutional characteristics. 
These were: repressed inflation, concentration of trade in the CMEA area, black market 
exchange rate premium, the familiarity with market institutions. 
The results of the authors showed the importance of initial conditions. Most of 
the characteristic initial conditions were strongly correlated and could be summed up in 
                                                 
22
 Section 3 will be devoted to these problems: the shadow economy, corruption, and 
clientelism. 
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two principal components. These two components explained between 64-75 per cent of 
the variability of the initial conditions. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Ranking of Transition Economies by the First Two Components of 
Initial Conditions 
 
 
 
Source: de Melo et al. (1997). 
The two principal components are: 
 
PRIN1: Macroeconomic distortions at the beginning of transition and unfamiliarity with 
market processes;  
PRIN2   Level of development and structural distortions. 
 
Figure 1 shows the values of the two principal components for the transition 
economies. One can see that the East Central European countries cluster in the first 
quadrant, while the ex-Soviet economies are high in the first component. A high level of 
structural imbalance, but relatively low macroeconomic distortions was found in the 
case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Due to earlier reforms a higher level of 
openness and marketization in Hungary, Poland and Croatia resulted in relatively low 
values of both macroeconomic and structural distortions. 
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The authors also found that adverse initial conditions were associated with 
slower economic liberalization, however, the effectiveness of reforms was not reduced 
once they were implemented. The relationship of liberalization and improvement of 
performance turned out highly non-linear over time. Another important result of this 
research is that policy was found the most important factor determining growth 
differences since both the speed and comprehensiveness of economic liberalization 
depends on it. The influence of initial conditions diminishes over time: monetary 
overhangs are dissipated through inflation, structural distortions are eroded as 
inefficient plants shut down, and familiarity with markets can be acquired through 
experience.  
It is obvious from the de Melo et. al study how difficult it is to capture the 
institutional characteristics and differences by quantitative methods in a model with 
many countries. For example, the familiarity with market institutions (or the lack of it) 
was represented by a proxy variable of the number of years under central planning. It 
was naturally much larger for ex-Soviet countries (71) than for East Central European 
countries (42), expressing the difference of having, or not having a generation in the 
society with prior experience with a market economy. For a more accurate analysis, 
however, this is obviously not sufficient. The difference, for example, between 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany on one hand, and Poland and Hungary, on the other, 
has been very great in terms of how much liberalization the people were exposed to 
during the last decades of socialism.  
Initial conditions strongly influenced production and productivity changes in 
agriculture also. As Macours and Swinnen (2000) has shown, the decline in agrarian 
production depended on pre-transition development and distortions, while reform 
policies had an important impact on subsequent productivity changes. The authors drew 
attention to the problem that one should be careful using output as an indicator of 
success. The fall of previously subsidized production, in fact, can be valued  positively, 
since it indicates improved allocation of resources. In contrast to the volume of 
production, productivity increase following reform measures is a better indicator of 
success. 
There were  great differences among the ex-Socialist economies in the power 
relations of the central authorities (i.e. the Planning Commissions) and the special-
interest organizations and monopolies. These differences strongly affected all aspects of 
the reform processes after the political changes took place, the speed, and scope of 
liberalization, privatization, the attraction of, or resistance to foreign direct investments 
and structural change. Even if it is very difficult, or in some cases perhaps impossible to 
quantify these aspects of the initial conditions, one should not lose sight of the fact that 
they are very important factors of how transition took place in the different countries, 
and what its outcome became.  
 
Institutions matter 
After the first shocks of the transition process, as recovery slowly started in 
several of the transition countries, the analysis extended from macroeconomic variables, 
structural characteristics, and initial conditions to the importance of institutions and 
their development. As was mentioned, the effects of adverse initial conditions diminish 
over time as the economy is gradually transformed into a market economy.  
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It is now widely accepted that economic growth and the attainment of prosperity 
depends in great part on the institutional framework of the rule of law and property 
rights protection. North (1990) showed how institutional development contributes to the 
effective working of markets, Murell (1992, 1996) discussed the sequencing problem of 
liberalization policy and institutional development in the transition process. It can be 
expected that the establishment and implementation of strong legal institutions become 
increasingly important for achieving sustainable growth. This may take more time than, 
for example, trade liberalization, but delaying the creation of a market-friendly 
environment can be very risky, as it may reverse the reform process and stabilization. 
Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2000) were among the first who tested how much 
explanatory value is added by institutional indicators in growth regressions in transition 
economies. They used two categories of market-friendly institutions with separate 
effects on performance:  
a. the legal framework of economic activity, including property rights, 
contract and bankruptcy law, and enforcing them even-handedly and 
transparently.  
b. political and civic freedom, including freedom of assembly, speech and the 
equal treatment of political and judicial bodies. 
They used the “Economic Freedom” index of the Heritage Foundation23, the 
“Nations in Transit” reports from Freedom House, the transition indicators of EBRD, 
the World Bank survey of 1998 on institutional environment and the country risk ratings 
published by Euromoney. They covered many institutional factors, such as trade, 
taxation, government intervention, democratic and economic freedom, the effectiveness 
of the legal system, foreign investment, property rights, the enforcement of contracts, 
black market, corruption, etc. Up till now, this is one of the most wide-ranging 
quantitative studies of the relationship of institutions and economic performance. 
 Havrylyshyn and Rooden found a surprisingly consistent and high degree of 
correlation between the ranking of countries’ level of institutional development. Their 
results were in accordance with previous investigations, when showing that 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms are the two most important factors 
explaining output developments in transition economies. Their other interesting finding 
was that not only is economic liberalization determined by legal and political 
institutions, but the impact of good policies on growth is likely to be greater, the 
stronger and more developed these institutions are. Concluding the results of their 
investigation, Havrylyshyn and Rooden assert that the statistical value added to 
econometric explanations of growth by indicators of institutional development is 
significant, but not overwhelming.  
A special case of how institutional change affected growth can be observed in 
agriculture, where different methods of land reform and farm restructuring led to 
strongly divergent productivity changes. Lerman (2000) analyzed how land 
privatization methods (restitution or distribution), restructuring (of corporate farms), 
and the economic policy environment led to even greater differences in East Central 
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  We shall come back to the problem of reliability of the subjective rankings of different 
agencies based on expert outside opinion. 
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European countries in the agriculture than in industry. The successes and failures in 
agricultural reforms depended in great part on market-type institution building and on 
how land property and its use was regulated. 
Dewatripont and Roland (1996) pointed out that, as the systemic change from a 
socialist planned economy to capitalism is a historically unique event, economic theory 
has little to say on the problems and solution alternatives of the transition process24. The 
theories that western experts were relatively well-equipped with concerned 
macroeconomic stabilization, but it was obvious from the beginning that this is a 
necessary but insufficient condition of transition. What is really needed is large-scale 
institutional change. The problem is that these changes — like the creation of markets, 
privatization, restructuring, enforcement of property rights — need to take place without 
creating unmanageable disturbances, because the political support of reforms have to be 
maintained. 
The lack of prior knowledge and a significant amount of wishful thinking led to 
an underestimation of the difficulties and hardships of transition. Consequently, there 
was less precaution in policy implementation and less care for the social consequences 
than necessary, all of which aggravated the burden of the process. The astonishment, 
such as the unexpected size of the fall in output, and increase in unemployment, and the 
political backlash after the first significant changes, showed to what extent policy 
makers, advisers and theorists were unprepared for this unprecedented endeavor.  
One of the basic institutional changes relates to the role of the government. It 
was obvious that it has to differ fundamentally from the dictatorial state of planned 
economies, but views differed strongly on what are adequate government institutions for 
a market economy. There is consensus, however, that political and institutional stability 
is in great need, private property has to be protected from encroachment both by 
criminals and by the government, and consumers and taxpayers have to be sheltered 
from the rent-seeking of pressure groups. 
Since so little was known about transition, the outcome was strongly uncertain. 
Capitalism is a vast concept including very divergent systems and regimes. The 
economic and social experience gained by the different transition countries in the last 
decade  did not diminish the amount of uncertainty concerning further progress in 
transition. It was rightly suggested by Dewatripont and Roland that the theory and 
modeling of the transition process must integrate this relative ignorance and learning- 
by-doing in reforming the institutions.   
This ignorance was, and in many respects still is, related to the 
complementarities and interactions between the necessary steps in reform and institution 
building, including the effects of their timing and sequencing. Institutional change is 
seriously constrained by the political aspects of it: even if in the long run aggregate 
welfare is enhanced, beside the gainers, there are large groups of losers, and in the first 
period the majority may belong to them.  
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 They referred to the “Murphy’s law of Economic Policy” of Blinder (1987 p. 1.):  
„Economists have the least influence on policy where they know the most and most agree; they 
have the most influence on policy where they know the least and disagree vehemently.” In their 
opinion, this is especially valid for the economics of transition.  
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One of the reasons why the reforms lost much of their popular support so 
quickly was the unexpected and fast growth in income differences. This was especially 
conspicuous, as egalitarian income distribution was a characteristic feature of the 
Soviet-type systems. The current actual income gaps in the transition countries resemble 
more to the Latin American and Asian developing countries, than to the West-European 
welfare states. The relatively small, well-organized interest groups, like executives of 
financial institutions, members of parliament, local managers of multinational firms and 
lawyers could attain very strong increases in their incomes, while weakly organized 
state-employed doctors and teachers, pensioners, small farmers and the unemployed had 
to suffer great reductions in their real-incomes. 
In a democratic system reforms can not start if the majority of voters are not 
convinced of their advantages, and the reform process may stop, or be reversed, if they 
lose trust in it. Uncertainty and the danger of reversal were largely neglected in the early 
period of transition and by the advisers advocating the “big bang” strategy. Gradual and 
partial changes are preferable to avoid larger scale reversals, as the reactions to the 
reform steps are better observable. One would guess that taking into account 
uncertainties slows the transition process. Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) produced a 
learning model showing that under certain assumptions, the opposite is the case. They 
studied the effect of the removal of subsidies in the state sector on unemployment. In 
the presence of uncertainty, the subsidy removal can be relatively fast, as it allows 
learning about the rate of job creation in the private sector. If the absorption of labor is 
low, the state can increase subsidies to reabsorb some part of the unemployed. This kind 
of fine-tuning in reform implementation can in fact maintain or accelerate the transition 
process, compared to the case of more radical measures, which can lead to partial or 
total reversal of them.  
Some of the serious incentive problems characteristic of the Soviet-type 
economies survive in the transition period and beyond, depending on how large the 
state-owned sector remains and how government-firm relationship develops. One of the 
crucial incentive problems is the soft budget constraint25 when the planner regularly 
bails out loss incurring firms. Saving firms that showed deficit induced planners to shift 
resources from good firms to bad ones, leading to lower efficiency in both of them.  
Incentive distortions do not disappear fast. They remain, or change slowly in the 
state sector and remain in many cases even in the private sector if they are financially 
linked to state-owned banks26. Hardening the budget constraint of enterprises is a 
necessary condition of stabilization, but handling the great inherited stock of bad loans 
by the decentralized system of financial institutions is a serious problem for all 
transition countries. Banks in many cases can not be too hard with enterprises, because 
to initiate bankruptcy may reveal the weakness of the banks’ financial situation, which 
would make their pending privatization difficult or impossible. This is the reason why 
banks burdened with a lot of bad loans put pressure on the governments for bailout 
subsidies to refinance bad firms, so that they themselves can escape hardening the 
budget constraint, or failures of the enterprises linked to them. In certain cases, it is 
preferable for banks to help the restructuring of firms with bad loans, rather than closing 
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  See  Kornai (1979) (1980). 
26
 This could be well observed in the case of the Czech Republic. 
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them. Considerations such as these explain the difficulties and slowness of the 
disappearance of soft budget constraints. 
 
Liberalization of trade and protectionist pressures 
Trade liberalization was very comprehensive and happened suddenly, or within a 
very short period in East Central European countries as part of the reform package of 
stabilization, marketization, and restructuring27. It was partly the result of strong 
pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, and the advisers following their “liberal 
orthodoxy”28. The other reason was the weak resistance to liberalization29. The first 
reactions to import liberalization were very positive; a feeling of satisfaction 
characterized both the consumers and the business community; or in some countries it 
was part of the euphoria following the regained independence and the end of Soviet and 
communist domination. After the long period of isolation from the western markets, the 
disappearance of shortages and the inflow of fashionable, good-quality import goods 
contributed to the satisfaction and general acceptance of the advantages of trade 
liberalization. 
However, this positive attitude did not last long, and as output declined and 
unemployment grew, the demand for protection of domestic production strongly 
increased. It caused some surprise among policy makers and economists that the first 
firms aggressively claiming protection were foreign-owned enterprises and joint 
ventures. They were more skilled in lobbying and had stronger arms blackmailing the 
authorities. They asked for tariff increases for competing products and tariff reductions 
on their inputs, tax exemptions, and the extension of non-tariff barriers, like 
administrative and procedural protection: special health, environmental, quality and 
trade-mark requirements. The mood of domestic businesses changed also, the demand 
for protection by the state against competition fast increased. Courses were organized to 
teach domestic firms how to prepare and present complaints of anti-dumping and 
market-disruption procedures. In government procurement processes and decisions, the 
neutrality requirement was in many cases neglected and domestic firms were preferred.  
The farmers’ organizations and the lobbies of food industries developed strong 
resistance against trade liberalization. While they lost much of their previous subsidies 
and eastern markets, they had to face strong agrarian protection in the West. These 
pressure groups succeeded in keeping or reintroducing quantitative restrictions on many 
food products.  
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 See in more detail: Gács (1994), Rosati (1994), Nagy (1994). 
28
 In the case of the Baltic countries it was the consequence of winning suddenly their 
independence without having custom authorities, officers or tariff laws. 
29
 As explained by Gács (1994, pp.137-8): “the usual pressure groups resisting economic 
reforms were either non-existent or virtually ineffective… After the changes of 1989, the party-
state did not exist any more and the behavior of the state was dominated by pro-liberalization 
policies of the government. Earlier, managers had traditionally derived their power from their 
close relation to the communist parties. With the disappearance of this background, most 
managers felt themselves discredited and for the sake of survival in their old positions, they did 
not attempt at making any noise, even when the interest of their enterprises became seriously 
endangered. Old trade unions were also discredited and the new ones were either supporters of 
the new government, or were too immature to act efficiently.” 
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Due to protectionist pressures, a significant portion of the trade liberalization 
measures were revoked, and the fact that many of them could remain in place was due 
mostly to the membership in the WTO and to the efforts to join the EU. The idea that 
protectionist restriction is in most cases good only for small producing minorities and 
harmful to the majority of consumers and many businesses is still not generally 
accepted and disseminated.  
One should not forget that there is no tradition of liberalized trade (and very little 
of liberalism in general) in Eastern Europe. Protectionist teaching and thinking have 
prevailed for more than a century since the time when many of the nation-states were 
created in the region, as well as during the Nazi and Communist regimes. Economic 
protectionism was blended with nationalism, in some periods with chauvinistic jingoism 
or anti-imperialist hostility. In the ten years of transition, much of this has changed, but 
xenophobic and protectionist ideas are still lingering in the background and can surface 
any time. 
From the point of view of the catching-up process of the East Central European 
economies, any further retreat in trade liberalization would be extremely dangerous. On 
the contrary, a gradual dismantling of existing restrictions is necessary. In the globalized 
world of today all the arguments of previous successful experiences of export-led 
growth combined with protectionism became obsolete or out of place. The 
consequences of retaliations by the main trading partners and the international financial 
and trade organizations following any significant protectionist measures could retard or 
break the fragile tendency of economic growth in the transition countries. 
 
Liberalization of capital flows and the role of multinational firms 
It is becoming more and more evident that the catching-up of the smaller 
transition countries depends on their integration into the global economy and 
consequently on how their relations with the multinational companies are developing. 
This was not evident at the beginning of the transition process, in the early nineties. It 
was clear that privatization is necessary to get rid of the inefficiencies of state 
ownership and central planning, but many policy makers and academic advisers thought 
that by replacing the bureaucratic incentives with profit-oriented ones would result in a 
significant productivity increase30. The view at the time was influenced also by the 
privatization experiences of the West-European countries, where government 
downsizing, and replacing state property with “real” owners and bureaucratic direction 
with good corporate governance was the major aim.  
The question of how to deal with foreign investors, and especially with 
multinational firms, became a problem for the new governments. A conflict of interest 
emerged among and within the political parties. On the one hand, it was obvious that 
foreign investments were much needed by the transition economies because of a great 
and long-standing shortage of capital, the huge technological gap, and lack of 
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 A typical view was expressed by Blommerstein et al. (1991) at an OECD conference: “Under 
more competitive market structures, privatization coupled with appropriate incentives would 
also promote a general increase in the effort of workers and managers to improve organizational 
and technological conditions”. 
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managerial skills. On the other hand, selling state assets to foreigners was counter to the 
interests of the clients of the ruling political parties, who aspired to purchase these 
assets but did not have the financial means to compete with foreign investors. The 
inherited managerial staff of the large state-owned companies, who were afraid that the 
new private owners, especially if they were foreigners, would fire them, contributed to 
the resistance. In many cases the employees and workers who worried about keeping 
their jobs have also sided with the managers. It was not difficult to find popular support 
with nationalistic slogans against the “selling out of national wealth”. However, the 
political and economic elite was divided on the question of foreign ownership. A certain 
part of it saw great opportunities not only to keep their positions and influence, but also 
to increase it by associating with foreign investors and by accepting CEO positions in 
local affiliates of multinational firms. The great differences across the transition 
countries concerning the influx of FDI was in great part due to the different outcomes of 
the political power struggle on the issue of how much foreign investors should be 
attracted or warded off. 
There was not only local opposition to foreign investments, but many transition 
experts expressed skepticism concerning them31. They thought that legal reform, market 
institution building and stabilization of the post-socialist economies were preconditions 
of a significant foreign capital inflow. The investment “push effect” of multinational 
firms was strongly underestimated. Blanchard et al. (1991) and Kornai (1989) expected, 
for example, that foreign investors would be cautious, waiting until favorable conditions 
for the security of property rights developed. The Economic Commission for Europe 
warned that fast privatization to foreigners may “simply transform a public monopoly 
into a private one”32. 
The experiences of the catching-up of Ireland and the new South-European 
members of the EU were conspicuously not taken into account. Privatization and 
foreign direct investments were the major factors of accelerated growth for Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland after their European integration, and FDI contributed considerably 
to their economic stability, and reduction of debt and inflation33. In the case of Ireland, 
for example, Barry and Bradley (1997) have shown that even though only 15 per cent of 
the firms are foreign owned, they employ 45 per cent of labor and produce 60 per cent 
of output. Foreign owned firms are not only bigger, but they are significantly more 
productive, more export-oriented and profitable than domestic owned ones. For this 
reason, foreign owned enterprises (in great part multinationals) became the cutting edge 
of faster than average growth of the South-European economies. 
In the ten years’ experience of the East Central European transition countries, it 
became clear that FDI acted as a very important agent of change and catching-up. 
Recent research results have shown that the more open and institutionally attractive the 
transition countries were to foreign investments, the faster their growth became after the 
decline at the early stage of systemic change34. Micro-level analyses indicated that the 
reason for this was that FDI provided the indispensable change of governance structure 
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 E.g. Blanchard (1991), Brabant (1992), Kornai (1989), Crane (1991), Eatwell et al. (1995). A 
detailed discussion of it can be found in Mihályi (2000). 
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 UN ECE (1990) p. 16. 
33
  See in more detail: Bliss and Macedo (1990), Larre and Torres (1991), Nagy (1999). 
34
  See  Landesmann (2000), Carlin et al. (1997) and (1999).  
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needed for “active restructuring”. Landesmann (2000), comparing the transition 
countries, found that those economies are growing fastest which attracted the largest 
shares of FDI. Firms with foreign involvement are more capital-intensive, invest more, 
show higher productivity levels, and are more export-oriented than the domestically 
owned enterprises. 
In Table 1 some measures are presented about the characteristic features of the 
so called foreign investment enterprises in manufacturing in relation to these features in 
all enterprises in the manufacturing industry35. The selected indicators are: equity 
capital, employment, investment, sales or output, and exports. It can be seen that 
foreign-owned firms have higher than average labor productivity levels (sales and 
output shares are greater than employment). Their investment intensities are also higher 
than average (investment/sales and investment/employee ratios are higher than unity) 
and so are the capital intensities as measured by equity capital per employee. In 
addition, they are more export-intensive than other firms are (export shares are higher 
than sales or output shares) 36.  
 
Table 1 
Share of foreign investment enterprises  
by main indicators of manufacturing companies, 1996, 1997, per cent 
 
 Equity 
capital 
Employment Investments Sales  or 
output 
Export 
sales 
Czech Republic1  21.52 13.1 33.5 22.6  
Czech R. 19973  16.0 31.2 26.3 42.0 
Hungary  67.44 36.1 82.5 61.4 77.5 
Hungary 1997 71.84 42.8 79.85 66.7 75.4 
Poland6 30.4 15.0 43.1 30.3 33.8 
Slovakia3  19.4 13.0 24.7 21.6  
Slovenia  15.6 10.1 20.3 19.6 25.8 
 
Notes: 1) Companies with 100 and more employees. – 2) Own capital. – 3) companies with 25 and more 
employees. – 4) Nominal capital in cash. – 5) Compared to the whole industry; corresponding figure for 
1996: 68.6%; – 6) Corporate sector 
Source: Hunya (1999).  
 
These are clear indications of the pre-eminent role foreign investments and 
foreign firms play in the acceleration of growth in the transition countries. Gomulka 
(2000 p. 78.) summed this up the following way: “the negative experience of the Czech 
Republic [with voucher-type privatization] and the much better growth performance of 
Poland, Estonia and, more recently, Hungary, which has led to the »new wisdom«, 
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  The data used by Hunya (2000) was compiled from company level balance sheets, where 
foreign investment enterprises are defined as companies with some degree of foreign ownership 
involvement. However, it was found that foreign ownership means in most cases a decisive 
influence on the governance structure. 
36
 A part of the difference between foreign and domestic owned firms may be due to the 
variance in the accuracy of their reporting. It may be assumed that tax-avoiding and profit-
hiding is more frequent in domestic firms. 
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namely that the success of transition depends above all on a rapid creation of conditions 
– institutional, legal, microeconomic and macroeconomic – which are conductive to the 
development and growth of a new private sector (including FDI)”. 
There are of course very divergent motives for foreign capital to get involved in 
different branches; there is no sign that FDI in East Central European countries would 
have been oriented mostly towards labor-intensive, low-skill, or domestic market 
oriented manufacturing. Comparative research mentioned above has shown that foreign 
involvement is strong in a number of capital-intensive, skill-intensive and export-
intensive industries (particularly transport goods, electrical and optical equipment). In 
domestic market-oriented industries such as food, dairy products, beverages, or tobacco, 
foreign firms are also strongly represented.  
The distribution of foreign investments across manufacturing branches does not 
follow the traditional comparative advantages of these countries, they are motivated 
more by increasing returns37, where the multinational firms have significant advantages 
(concentrated R&D, economies of scale in component production, sales and repair 
services).  
The experiences of the last ten years’ development clearly indicate that 
resistance to foreign capital inflow — like resistance to trade liberalization — is 
detrimental to growth, and the best results in restructuring, modernization and export 
growth were achieved by countries which attracted more foreign investment. The effect 
of FDI and especially of the increased presence of multinationals on the rule of law is 
more ambiguous. There are indications that some of these investors, the more 
aggressive ones, frequently used bribery to obtain favorable conditions and protection, 
contributing to the decline of public morality. In other cases, it could be observed that 
the more conservative and well-established foreign firms, that have  longer business 
perspectives in the country, carefully avoided the use of illegal methods and refused to 
take sides in the political struggles, even if they were invited to do so. Thus, they 
showed a good example and encouraged the development of an efficient and law-
abiding institutional system. 
 
3. The rule of law  
The transition from centrally-planned dictatorships to democratic market 
economies in Eastern Europe was a historically unique, unprecedented process, 
producing much astonishment compared to expectations. Most experts and advisers did 
not foresee, for example, the size of the decline of economic activities and the 
consequent unemployment38. Another unexpected concomitant result was the 
breakdown of the rule of law, with a strong increase in criminality and all kinds of 
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 This is very similar to what Pratten (1988) and O’Malley (1992) have found in the case of 
Irish FDI. 
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 This is mainly true for the Western advisers and their reformist local partners at the time when 
the systemic changes started. However, during the debates on the introduction of market-type 
reforms in the previous decades, their conservative Marxist-Leninist opponents argued with 
threats that liberalization of trade and prices and the introduction of profitability requirements 
could lead to bankruptcies and large unemployment in the majority of the socialist enterprises. 
They probably exaggerated this danger, but the reformers certainly underestimated it. 
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illegal activities. It was, in a sense, a natural consequence of liberation from the (more 
or less) strict dictatorial rule of the communist parties and their police state system. It 
was an expression of the measure of the alienation of the citizens from the totalitarian 
state and from its laws and rules, which did not, and could not suddenly change with 
free elections and the vacuum of power following it.  
The astonishment caused by the widespread lawlessness was partly due to the  — 
already mentioned — confusion: interpreting the self-destructive immobility of the 
communist system as stability. Autocratic regimes are more fragile, in fact, than they 
seem to be, or they try to lead us to believe. As they are based not on popular consensus 
or support, but on coercion and intimidation, their stability depends on the incentives of 
the officials and the repressive forces. If the rewards offered to these forces do not seem 
sufficient, or their fear of punishment is diminished, the dictatorial system can collapse 
more easily than expected, and a chaotic situation can emerge39. 
Even if subsequently valuable reasons can be found, it was surprising for most 
observers how fast and to what extent lawlessness spread in all transition countries after 
the collapse of the communist regimes. One could of course argue that in a despotic 
system there is no rule of the law, but a rule of lawlessness. The rulers, i.e. the 
nomenklatura, were always above the law; they could commit crimes, accept bribes, and 
enrich themselves by illegal means, as long as they remained in their powerful 
positions. In this sense there was not, and could not be, equality before the law in the 
Soviet-type systems40.  
Nevertheless, for the vast majority of the population there was an enormous 
number of laws, regulations and restrictions which had to be followed to avoid severe 
punishment. Dictatorial rule also meant efficient law enforcement agencies, reducing 
revealed criminality below the level of many liberal democratic countries. The 
combination of overwhelming regulations on the one hand, and lawlessness on the 
other, led to a constant feeling of insecurity, fear and distrust of the authorities. Freedom 
and democratic change meant liberation from the huge amount of restrictions and from 
fear of non-obedience. The double standards of lawlessness above, and expecting strict 
law-abiding behavior below severely corroded public morality. 
The lack or weakness of the rule of the law is one of the main obstacles to the 
economic catching-up of the East Central European societies and of their accession to 
the European Union. We shall discuss this in some detail in the following. 
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 Olson (1991) pointed out that : “If a government’s operatives, and especially those in the 
police and the military, believe that they will be punished if they fail to carry out their orders 
and rewarded if they do, an autocracy is secure…Since even the most awesome despotisms 
often rest on nothing more than a shared perception of their guards and administrators, they are, 
paradoxically, close to disorder and even to anarchy.” (pp.13-14.) 
40
 Lawlessness in this region goes further back in history than the socialist period. One can 
hardly speak of the rule of law in the nationalistic military dictatorships between the two World 
Wars or in the royalist and tsarist autocracies before in most of the East Central European 
countries. 
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Spread of the shadow economy 
Black or shadow economy usually means the unregistered (and consequently 
untaxed) economic activities. It can be found at all times in all societies, and there are 
strong indications that it has an increasing tendency41. The shadow economy existed and 
expanded in the Soviet-type economies too, its size being different depending on the 
more or less liberal character of economic policies and periods. It was mostly the 
consequence of the acute shortages in socialist economies, and in some countries (e.g. in 
Hungary and Poland) it became a more or less tolerated supplement to the state-owned 
sector. In the 1990s, in the transition countries, the huge decline in production, rapid 
increase of the deficit in the state budgets and large-scale tax avoidance directed the 
attention to the problems of illegal economic activities. 
It is difficult to gather information about and measure the size of the shadow 
economy, as in most cases it is illegal, and punishable if identified. It is typically a 
reaction of the economic agents who feel overburdened by the size of taxes and social 
security contributions. The cross-country analysis of Johnson et al. (1999 p. 19.) found 
that: “Hidden economy is larger in countries where tax rates are higher, where managers 
are more likely to pay bribes, where managers pay for Mafia-type protection and where 
managers have less faith in the legal system”. 
There is a large literature on the different methods of measurement of the 
shadow economy, a good review and criticism of them can be found in Lackó (1999) 
and Schneider and Enste (2000). The estimated size of the shadow economy and its 
growth can be seen on Table 2 where the results of the physical input method by 
Johnson et al. and Lackó are presented. 
 
Table 2 
Shadow Economies in Transition Countries 
(size of shadow economy as per cent of GDP) 
 Average 1989-1990 Average 1994-1995 
Countries     
 Johnson et al. Lackó Johnson et al. Lackó 
Bulgaria 24.0 26.1 32.7 35.0 
Croatia 22.8*  28.5* 38.2 
Czech Republic   6.4 23.0 14.5 23.2 
Hungary 27.5 25.1 28.4 30.5 
Macedonia    46.5 
Poland 17.7 27.2 13.9 25.9 
Romania 18.0 20.9 18.3 31.3 
Slovakia   6.9 23.0 10.2 30.2 
Slovenia  26.8  24.0 
Average 17.6 17.6 20.9 31.6 
 
Sources: Schneider and Enste (2000) calculations using values of Johnson et al. (1998) and Lackó  (1999). 
* For Croatia: Madzarevic and Milkulic (1997), using the discrepancy method. 
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The estimated average share of the shadow economy in percentages of GDP 
increased in the East Central European countries from 17.6 per cent to 20.9 and 31.6 per 
cent42, respectively in the first five years of the transition period. This can be compared 
to similar calculation on the OECD countries43, showing an average of 15.1 per cent of 
estimated shadow economy in 1990. While at the beginning of the transition the 
unofficial economy was relatively low e.g. in Czechoslovakia, it increased significantly 
in all East Central European countries, and the differences among them diminished. 
Without going into the details of the different methods and problems of 
estimations, and taking into account the large uncertainties of the data used, the results 
show clearly two things. One is that the share of the shadow economy is large in the 
transition countries, about twice as big as in developed market economies, and second, 
that its size increased very substantially in the first period of the transition process.  
The significant rise of the shadow economy is obviously linked to the decline of 
production and income, which increased the tendency of tax evasion. Many firms 
preferred not to pay taxes and social security contributions in order to avoid deficit and 
bankruptcy, especially when the danger of detection and penalty diminished.   
Decentralization and privatization of state owned firms gave birth to many new 
small-size enterprises, while increased unemployment, in many cases, led to self-
employment. Due to these developments the number of entities with potential to join the 
shadow economy increased and contributed significantly to the rise of unregistered and 
untaxed activities.  
The choice to go underground was linked to the general decline of the rule of law 
and of the loyalty towards public authorities, an expression of the longstanding 
alienation from the state. As Vihanto (2000) pointed out, people have learned in the 
Soviet-type systems that laws are arbitrary decrees of the non-representative 
governments, so they are not meant to be generally enforced. Consequently, people in 
these states have difficulties, and need to get used to the idea that universal compliance 
is a prerequisite for a sustained working of the legal system. Even if opting for illegality 
may be a favorable decision in the short term, it hinders the transition to a free market 
economy. 
The significant extension of tax avoidance is obviously linked with the declining 
efficiency of the administration in transition countries and with the increasing amount of 
bribery and corruption. Friedman et al. (1999) found in a large cross-country 
investigation that entrepreneurs go underground not only to avoid taxes but also to 
reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. According to Johnson et al. (1999 p. 
18.) “Either firms hide their activities in order to reduce the bribes they need to pay, or 
they pay bribes in order to be able to hide their activities”. There is a strong correlation 
between the amount and complexity of regulation and the size of the shadow 
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 The difference  may be due to the numerous differences in the methodology used by Johnson 
et al. and Lackó. 
43
 See Schneider and Enste (2000) p. 102. 
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economy44. The increasing frequency of unofficial economic activities in the transition 
countries was a consequence of the resilience of large-scale regulations, while the 
enforcement of tax laws declined. 
It is questionable how sincere politicians and administrators are when they call 
for a substantial reduction of the shadow economy. High taxes and complex regulations 
lead to increased power of the bureaucrats and, for some, more chances for corruption45. 
Both entrepreneurs and administrators know well that in certain cases it is more 
advantageous to pay bribes than taxes. As many voters gain from unofficial activities 
and lax legislation of taxes, for re-election purposes, politicians may find it preferable to 
only talk about “law and order” and do little for stricter collection of taxes and social 
security payments. 
The East Central European countries inherited a relatively developed welfare 
system compared to their general level of development, necessitating a high level of 
public expenditures. A large shadow economy means relatively low tax and social 
security income, which may lead to a vicious circle: the larger the burden on firms, the 
more they opt for exit (illegality), increasing the pressure on public finance, resulting in 
higher nominal tax rates, and so on.  
It is not evident what the effect of the shadow economy is on the official 
economy. Schneider and Enste, after reviewing the literature on the subject, found that 
its “effects on economic growth remain ambiguous”. Several investigations concluded 
that the two economies move together, and there is a positive relationship between their 
growth. Others46 concluded that the activities of the informal sector have a negative 
impact on economic growth, because of the negative correlation of the informal sector 
and public infrastructure, which in turn is a key element of economic growth. Untaxed 
economic activities reduce the income of the state and are evidently unfair for the law-
abiding citizens and firms, but from the point of view of the general growth of the 
economy, they are not necessarily harmful. The question is how they use the resources 
withheld from taxation. Are the resources better allocated with regard to general welfare 
than under state allocation? This ambiguity is a consequence of the difficulty of 
answering this question.  
There can be little doubt that in the transition countries the informal sector of the 
economy contributed significantly to the muddling through the difficulties of the 
transitional crisis. It gave work to many unemployed people and helped the survival of 
small and medium size firms. It was in the shadow economy that new business-persons 
have learned the entrepreneurial spirit and dynamism, contributing to competition and 
increasing the efficiency of the economy. However, working in the shadow economy 
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 According to the estimated model of Friedman et al. (1999) a one point increase in the index 
of regulation (ranging from 1–5) is associated with a 10 per cent increase in the shadow 
economy for 69 countries. 
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 This depends, of course, on how severely the bureaucrats’ activities are controlled.  The level 
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 Loayza (1996) found empirical evidence for Latin American countries that a one percentage 
increase in the ratio of shadow economy in the GDP results a 1.2 per cent decrease in the 
growth rate of official real GDP per capita. 
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can be disadvantageous for the work force, for there is usually no work contract, and in 
many cases employees have no access to social security or legal protection. 
A great disadvantage of the hidden economy is that, after a certain time, it 
becomes an impediment to private sector development, and consequently to economic 
growth. Firms usually can remain in the shadow while they are small; the bigger they 
become the more difficult it is to hide activities, sell their products, hire labor, or to get 
credit. Moreover, hidden firms have none or minimal access to debt and equity markets 
to raise new capital. For this reason, many of them prefer to remain small and hidden, 
even if they have the opportunity to grow.  
An important part of the growth of the shadow economy was the sudden 
explosion of such criminal activities as drug and arms trafficking, prostitution, gambling 
and extortion. This contributed much more than other unregistered activities to the 
breaking down of the rule of law and to a widespread feeling of insecurity. In such 
conditions security guards and private police forces are mushrooming, sometimes 
fighting each-other, deteriorating even more public security. The unofficial enterprises 
are in many instances financed by and even intertwined with criminal activities, which 
help them launder their money. The increase of criminal activities is damaging for the 
lawful and secure environment, necessary conditions for attracting foreign investment, 
progress with EU integration, and catching-up47. 
The greater the shadow economy, the bigger the discrepancy between the 
registered economy and the real economy. Statistical data of output, employment, 
income, consumption, etc will be less reliable. Policy makers have to face the fact that 
much of their information on the economy is deficient, and they have to consider how 
their policy decisions will influence the unregistered part of the economy. 
As a greater size of the shadow economy is a sign of the lower level of the rule 
of law, there can be little surprise that a positive relationship was found between the 
extent of corruption and the unregistered economic activities. After investigating 49 
countries, Friedman et al. (1999. p. 20.) concluded: “In summary, the relationship 
between the share of unofficial economy and rule of law (including corruption) is strong 
and consistent across eight measures provided by six distinct organizations. All eight of 
the indices suggest that countries with more corruption have a higher share of unofficial 
economy.” However, the causal relationship of corruption and illegal economic 
activities can go both ways: if corruption is widespread and bribes are an important part 
of the fixed costs of firms, these firms can go underground to avoid the pressure of 
corruption48. On the other hand, entrepreneurs may find it advantageous to bribe 
officials in order to avoid tax and social security expenditures. In this way more 
corruption and larger shadow economy are complementary49. 
While the contribution of the shadow economy to growth of the registered 
economy is doubtful, it is not questionable that it has a negative effect on the fairness 
and the equality of sacrifice in the society, and consequently on the rule of law. The 
more the society and the authorities find acceptable the activities in the informal sector, 
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 Referring to Yugoslavia Ash (2000) concluded: “A crucial test – this we learned from other 
transitions – is whether they can establish the rule of law in a highly criminalized society.” 
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 Rose-Ackermann (1997). 
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 Johnson et al. (1998). 
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the more they damage public morality. Informal activities naturally reduce public 
income and are especially harmful to tax compliance. It is not merely the loss of tax 
revenues or resource allocation problems that are the result of the shadow economy. 
Their negative impact on the rules, norms and institutions of a healthy economy can be 
even more corrosive. A large and growing shadow economy shows not only that the tax 
and social security payments and state regulations are high and hardly tolerable, but also 
that the legitimacy of the social order is endangered. 
 
Corruption and State Capture 
Similar factors causing the decline of the rule of law in the context of the shadow 
economy could be observed in the spreading and strengthening of corruption. There are 
many types of corruption, which can come under the same definition of “the abuse of 
public power for private benefit”50. They include bribe paid for obtaining licenses, 
access to publicly-provided goods and services, procurement of public investment 
contracts, influencing tax regulations, obtaining jobs, or promotion in the public sector, 
etc. A distinction should be made between “small” and “grand” corruption, the latter 
being in many cases politically motivated and often tied to capital investment projects. 
If it is difficult to measure the size of the shadow economy, it is much more 
difficult to measure corruption, as in the latter case both the private and public  parties 
are interested in hiding the facts. To measure corruption, it is not possible to use 
objective variables as for the hidden economy, such as the currency demand or 
electricity utilization. For the quantification of corruption indices of private rating 
agencies are used that rely on replies to questionnaires by consultants and experts51. 
They all have the drawback of being subjective, therefore contain a serious risk of 
reverse causation: performance perception may bias ratings by experts52. However, 
since the correlation of corruption indices prepared with different methods, and based 
on data received from different consultants is very high, and especially since the ranking 
of countries according to the corruption indices is very similar, with the necessary 
reservations one can have a certain amount of confidence in the reliability of such 
measures of corruption53. 
In a recent publication Kaminski (2001) presented a comparison of different 
estimations of corruption in the transition countries, of which the East Central European 
countries’ indices are presented in Table 3. Two kinds of corrupt behavior are 
distinguished: administrative corruption as revealed in illegitimate payments to public 
officials, and state capture measured by the percentage of firms directly affected by the 
‘purchase’ of laws and regulations.  
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 As Wei (2001) succinctly remarked “Like pornography, corruption is difficult to quantify, but 
you know when you see it”. 
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  See  Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2000). 
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 The methods of measuring corruption by the perception of experts are strongly criticized by 
Sík (2000), who argues that „independent information is highly unlikely from a self-selected, 
small and closed circle of experts”. He proposes a direct method of investigating actual cases of 
corruption.  
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The level of estimated corruption in the first five countries (the so called 
“Luxembourg Group” of the candidate countries) is lower than in the last five countries 
(the “Helsinki Group”). State “capture” is remarkably high in Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Slovakia. There seems to be a close relationship between the different measures of 
corruption. When both administrative corruption and state capture is on a high level, it 
suggests that the system acts deliberately to set the rules of game in ways maximizing 
rent-seeking behavior for those enjoying political power. “Under these circumstances, 
corruption feeds on itself by fuelling counterproductive, corruption-generating 
regulations” —  remarks Kaminski (2001, p.7). 
 
Table 3 
Measures of corruption in East Central European countries 
 
 EBRD (2000): 
progress in 
transition 1/ 
Corruption 
Perception 20002/ 
State Capture3/ Administrative 
corruption4/ 
Czech Republic 100 35 27 44 
Estonia 90 26 24 28 
Hungary 98 29 17 30 
Poland 94 37 29 28 
Slovenia 85 27 17 25 
Bulgaria 79 43 68 37 
Latvia 82 44 73 25 
Lithuania 82 44 27 49 
Slovakia 89 43 59 44 
Romania 73 52 74 56 
 
Sources: Kaminski (2001) derived from data in EBRD (2000), World Bank (2000), Transparency 
International (2001), World Bank (2001). 
Notes: 
  
1/
 Indices of progress in transition in East Central European  countries derived from EBRD 2000. For 
each country, eight “grades” (ranging between 1 and 4+) of the progress in creating foundations for 
competitive markets were summed with “pluses” and “minuses” treated as plus or minus 0.5. For each 
assessed area the maximum grade (4+) reflects the standards typical of advanced industrial economies. 
The index was normalized in terms of a most advanced country among transition economies. The higher 
the value of the index the more advanced a country is in terms of transition to mature market economy 
.
2/
 Corruption Perception Indices (CPI) as reported by Transparency International multiplied by 10 and 
inverted. The value of the index equals to 100 for a country with the highest perception of corruption. 
3/
 State capture dada derived from Hellman et al. (2000/a) inverted and multiplied by 100 and 
standardized in terms of the most “corrupt” country. The closer the value of index is to 100, the more 
corrupt a country is in relation to other East  Central European  economies. 
4/
 The measure of administrative corruption (bribes as a share of the annual revenue of the firms) as 
reported in World Bank (2000). 
 
As long as corruption could not be measured and compared, some authors 
assumed that corruption might increase economic growth, as bribes may speed up  
decisions by the authorities, and bureaucrats may work harder if they can expect  such a 
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reward54. However, all of the empirical studies done in the field recently refute this 
“bribery-as-grease” hypothesis, and agree that corruption tends to lower economic 
growth55. Mauro (1995) used the country risk indicators of Business International 
(1981, 1984) to measure institutional efficiency and political stability. He found that the 
indices related to the judiciary system, red tape, and corruption are closely related and 
can be regarded as good indices of the degree of bureaucratic efficiency in a country. 
There is a strong association between bureaucratic efficiency and political stability, 
richer countries tend to have better institutions than poorer countries, and fast-growing 
countries have a higher bureaucratic efficiency index than slow-growing ones. Legal 
systems obviously have a strong influence on corruption, but their effectiveness depends 
on the political and cultural setting in which they work. Triesman (1999) found that a 
system where the judiciary is not independent and judges have a broad discretion can 
even stimulate corruption, increasing the toll of bribery. 
As far as the effect on growth is concerned it was found that bureaucratic 
inefficiency in general, and corruption, in particular, are strongly negatively associated 
with the investment rate. One can state with high probability that institutional 
inefficiency and corruption cause low investment, and this is the main channel through 
which bad institutions lower growth rates56. If corruption results in more tax-avoidance, 
as is the case in transition countries, it reduces public income and expenditures, 
including public investments. Public procurement contracts influenced by corruption 
can lead to exaggerated costs of construction57, inferior services, or to the use of cheap, 
low-quality materials. Consequently, the loss caused by corruption is much higher then 
the bribe itself. Moreover, in the case of transition economies the major disadvantage of 
corruption can be the worsening reputation of the country and the loss of confidence of 
foreign investors. 
Most of these effects are indirect, but corruption can directly affect the growth 
performance by leading to misallocation of the investment among sectors. The reason 
for this is that corrupt government officials prefer those expenditures where they can 
collect bribes and if possible huge ones. This is frequent in large capital investment 
projects such as the construction of bridges, hospitals, airfields, purchase of medical 
equipments, etc. In a cross-country analysis Mauro (1997) found strong evidence that 
government expenditures on education and health are negatively and significantly 
correlated with higher levels of corruption, while both of them play a determining role 
in economic development. It is more difficult to prove, but is very likely, that corruption 
leads to high capital expenditures on useless (so called “white elephant") projects.  
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 E. g. Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968). 
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 See  Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Mauro (1995) and (1997), Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997), Kaufmann and Wei (1999). 
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 According to Mauro (1995 p. 700.) a one-standard-deviation improvement in the corruption 
index is significantly associated with an increase in the average investment rate by 3.3 per cent 
of GDP. 
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 Tanzi (1997) is quoting a report of Transparency International on the city of Milan, where 
after a great corruption scandal broke out, within the space of two years “the cost of city rail 
links fell by 52 per cent, the cost of one kilometer of subway fell by 57 per cent, and the budget 
for the new airport terminal was reduced by 59 per cent.” 
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Tanzi (1997) found strong evidence that corruption reduces growth by increasing 
public investment while at the same time reducing its productivity. It was found also 
that in a corrupt environment, periodic current expenditures (so called “operation and 
maintenance” costs) are not accompanied by adequate level of investments, thus 
reducing the efficiency of such expenditures. Reduction of growth is induced by the 
deterioration of the quality of infrastructure, which, in turn, is frequently caused by 
corruption, increasing the costs of doing business.  
Distortions in the sectoral or local allocation of government spending are 
frequently politically motivated, and corruption is intertwined with political pressure or 
favors. Politicians frequently steer the approval of infrastructure projects towards 
certain locations where domestic or foreign firms are planning investments in exchange 
for bribes. Alternatively, they may offer “free” infrastructure facilities (roads, 
electricity, communication, etc.) to attract investors toward their home districts. 
Wei (1997) studied the effect of corruption on the countries’ ability to attract 
foreign investment and found strong evidence that corruption in the host countries is 
negatively associated with FDI. As corruption is inherently secretive and arbitrary, the 
implicit contract between the briber and the person to be bribed can not be enforced. 
The consequent uncertainty deters many potential investors. The experiences of the 
transition countries conspicuously support the negative relationship between corruption 
and foreign investment. 
In the East Central European countries the state sector was, and in some cases 
still is, very large. Privatization in trade and industry has developed relatively fast, while 
privatization in infrastructure is lagging behind. The more so, as it is not clear and 
decided what should remain in the possession of central and municipal governments, 
and what should be privatized? It is well known also, that during the socialist period, 
infrastructural investments of various kinds,  were strongly neglected, and in most cases 
were of inferior quality. Consequently, in the transition period there is a need for a lot of 
new investment projects in all these fields, offering lucrative opportunities to private 
contractors. Managers of these firms are frequently prepared to pay a “commission” to 
government officials for helping them win a contract, the “commission” being 
calculated as a percentage of the total costs of the project. In such cases, it is obviously 
not in the interest of the official to favor a low-cost project. Needless to say, that 
“commission” in many such cases is only a euphemism for what is essentially a bribe.  
Privatization by foreign investors and the influx of foreign capital in the 
transition countries turned out not to be accompanied with the importation of fair 
business morals; on the contrary, the managers of foreign firms have learned fast how to 
corrupt officials and politicians. In many cases the foreign firms offered lucrative jobs 
to local advisers with “good connections” to teach them whom and how to bribe or to be 
a go-between with the corrupt officials. There are widespread rumors about  what 
“price” (i.e. bribe) tax-exemptions, preferential credits, low-priced land for investments, 
etc. can be obtained, or that generally what percentage of  kick-back is offered and 
expected for a government contract. It is, of course, difficult or in most cases impossible 
to obtain reliable information on such arrangements, especially when the judiciary is not 
willing or able to reveal the information and prosecute those involved in such deals.  
The exact boundaries of what is considered “corruption” depend on culture: 
some people regard permissible what others consider liable to be persecuted. However, 
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in the East Central European countries public opinion polls showed that an 
overwhelming majority  favors the reduction of corruption and in many cases, it is 
regarded as public enemy number one58. 
Experiences confirm the finding of Triesman (1999) that societies with longer 
periods of democratic rule, free press, and more education, where the separation of 
“public” and “private” is clearer, have less corruption59. Let us finally remark that even 
if there are a number of reasons why corruption is impeding growth, it does not mean 
that it prevents it entirely. Other factors may be more conducive to growth, and 
outweigh the negative effect of corruption. 
State capture is an even greater danger in the transition economies for the rule of 
the law than the shadow economy and corruption. It was defined by Hellman et al. 
(2000/b), as “shaping the formation of the rules of the game (i.e. laws, rules, decrees 
and regulations) through illicit and non-transparent private payments to public 
officials”. Firms with various methods can not only circumvent laws and regulation, but 
can exert influence on their formation, on the design of economic and political 
institutions, eventually on the quality of governance. What is observed, in different 
degrees, in the transition process is that powerful firms could collude with public 
officials to extract rents through manipulation of state power, i.e. to capture the state. 
In a survey by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development60, it was found that in certain countries, public officials created a private 
market for the provision of the security of property and contract rights and rent-seeking 
opportunities, which a relatively small share of firms can obtain. In their analysis of 
state capture Hellmann et al. (2000/b) differentiated between influential and captor 
firms. The first group of firms consists of large state-owned enterprises with a large 
market share, secure property rights and close ties with the authorities. Captor firms are 
usually newly created enterprises, with less secure property rights and weaker ties to the 
state, facing stronger competitive pressures from incumbent firms. Influential firms 
exert their request without recourse to private payments, while captor firms pay for 
influencing the law-making behavior of public officials. 
In the investigation, firms were asked to assess the extent to which activities such 
as the sale of parliamentary legislation, decrees, court decisions, financing political 
parties, etc. had a direct impact on their business. The survey showed that the purchase 
of such activities is present across all transition countries, in varying degrees. State 
capture in the former Soviet states and in some of the East Central European countries 
was found to be high, while in the majority of the latter economies, it was relatively 
low. Captor firms grew much faster than other firms in the economies where state 
capture environment was strong, while this could not be observed where states provide a 
broader range of public goods for the market and the legislative process is more subject 
to political competition.  
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business environment across 22 transition economies. For a full description, see  Hellman et al. 
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The privatization process and the possibility of new entry created firms with 
higher insecurity in their property and contract rights, and displayed a greater demand 
for strengthening their security. Through private payments to public officials captor 
firms have succeeded in gaining greater protection, what most new entrants and 
privatized firms have been unable to achieve. The real danger in this respect is when 
corruption goes beyond the administration and reaches the level of the members of 
parliament. One can not expect severe anti-corruption legislation and its implementation 
from corrupt legislators. The many times futile efforts made in order to introduce 
transparency in the wealth status of legislators and high-level officials show that this 
danger is real.  
The development of the transition countries in this respect has shown that the 
initial introduction of civil liberties and checks on abuse of power were often 
insufficient to counterbalance the loss of control from the dismantling of the communist 
regime. This situation helped the emergence of state capture. It could be observed e.g. in 
mega  privatization deals, like telecommunication, energy production, or purchases of 
military equipment. In such cases the partners of the state sought to determine the rules 
of the game to secure monopoly positions, favorable pricing arrangements, state 
guarantees. 
By increasing the oversight by the civil society, freedom of press and 
independence of the judiciary a certain threshold of democratic reforms have to be 
reached to channel the strategies of firms away from state capture. Gradual de-
monopolization, supporting competition, and helping entry can direct firms to more 
legitimate means of influencing the decisions of the state. However, in several East 
Central European countries, it was observed that when the grasp of political power of 
the ruling parties weakened, they tried to reduce the transparency of the dealings of the 
state, and by attacking the freedom of the press and the independent decisions of the 
judiciary. The danger of a situation when capture of the state may emerge is not yet 
over. 
 
Clientelism and the creation of the “new middle class” 
One of the main causes of the weakening and breaking down of the rule of law in 
East Central Europe is strongly linked to the political and social processes of the 
introduction of democratic pluralism. The transformation of the socialist system to a 
market economy obviously entailed privatization, selling state assets to real owners, i.e. 
the creation or emergence of a new capitalist class, which could not have existed in the 
Soviet-type systems. There was a general political agreement among practically all 
political parties that privatization is necessary; the question was how fast and how much 
to privatize and who will be its beneficiaries, the new owners of privatized assets. In the 
election campaigns and the political struggles all the parties proclaimed that a “new 
middle class” had to be created, which was an euphemism for the capitalist class, even 
if it meant a larger social strata of entrepreneurs, self-employed professionals, and 
higher level bureaucrats. 
The creation of the “new middle class” signified on the one hand the 
governmental redistribution of assets, land and services, and on the other the legal and 
administrative frameworks of this redistribution. In the political power struggles in 
Eastern Europe, especially at the beginning of the transition, there was much more at 
 39
stake than is usual in western democracies. The question was not only which political 
group or coalition would govern the country in the next period, but also who will 
privatize the state assets worth billions of dollars, and to whom. Clientelistic networks 
evolved around the political parties and groupings eager to participate in the distribution 
of state-owned firms, in the redistribution of land and in obtaining profitable state 
contracts61. The slogan of “creating the new middle class” covered in fact a power 
struggle of the clients demonstrating strong party loyalties62.  
The eagerness of the client groups of the ruling political forces to get as much as 
possible of the redistributed wealth may be one of the reasons why there was too much 
emphasis on privatization and too little on marketization at the early phase of transition. 
Even if privatization is a necessary condition of a well functioning market economy, as 
Bromley (2000) pointed out, it is not sufficient, as in the absence of adequate 
institutions, a coherent factor and product market can not develop which would flaw the 
incentive structure. 
According to Sajo (1998), clientelism in contemporary political science means “a 
network of social relations where personal loyalty to the patron prevails against the 
modern alternatives of market relations, democratic decision making, and 
professionalism in public bureaucracies”. Even if clientelistic corruption pervades all 
areas of public life, clientelism is different from corruption: it is a form of social 
organization, while corruption is an individual social behavior. Clientelism inherited 
much from the nomenklatura legacy of the socialist period and became a more or less 
stable form of social organization in the East Central European societies63. This is a 
consequence of the specific circumstances of the birth of the democratic regimes. 
When the Communist parties lost their grip on power, the only surviving, all-
encompassing organized force that remained active was the state, with its huge and in 
great part incompetent bureaucracy. The parties winning the elections first offered high 
public service positions to their clients, and later opportunities to participate in the 
privatization process with favorable conditions. As it frequently happened, the party or 
coalition in power lost the next election, the clients of the different political tendencies 
had the opportunity to occupy high-level government positions or had their share in 
privatization, or both. This is how a great part of the “new middle class” has been 
created, involving enormous income differences separating them from the impoverished 
and partly unemployed “lower classes”, who are the majority of the society. 
Participation in the privatization process and in the redistribution of capital, to 
become capitalists, was one of the major aims of many clients of the different political 
parties. Managers of enterprises and agricultural co-operatives, enriched nomenklatura 
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government. 
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members, as well as victims of previous injustices and other enterprising persons, used 
their good connections and party-loyalty to get inside information on the opportunities 
and favors in the privatization process. As most of them did not have the necessary 
funds to buy state assets, they used their good connections to get loans from the state-
owned banks on favorable conditions. Many of these loans were never repaid and 
contributed to the bad portfolios of the banks64. The consolidation of the banks in the 
mid-nineties in nearly all East Central European countries, which demanding billions of 
dollars of taxpayers money, became necessary due to other reasons too, but a significant 
part of it was the consequence of politically motivated lending of money without the 
necessary prudential considerations. 
The moral dilemma created by large-scale restitution and privatization of state 
assets goes beyond the problem of lawfulness. The different methods of privatization 
can be rationally justified on the ground that the resources privately owned will be more 
efficiently used, while the distribution of these resources could be legalized by freely 
elected parliaments. However, this redistribution could hardly be accepted by the public 
as just and fair. The sudden creation of extreme richness was regarded by a great part of 
the society as questionably legal, and certainly unjust. But if it is done on political 
grounds, avoiding transparency and competitive bidding, many times favoring not the 
best offer, then it contributes substantially to the decline of the rule of law and public 
morality. 
As the privatization process is coming to its end, clientelist networks are 
concentrating on government procurement and investment contracts, and well-paid 
leading positions in state institutions or state-sponsored projects. As the state sector is 
still large in all transition countries and goes much beyond the government 
administration (including railways, airlines, the military, education, health services, the 
judiciary, arts) there is a great number of lucrative leading positions which can be filled 
and re-filled with each switch of government. This happens in all democratic societies, 
the difference with the newly emerging democracies is how wide-scale these 
replacements are and how far they are based on political loyalty rather than on 
professional qualities. The result is disruption of the activities of the different 
institutions, reducing their efficiency, and spreading insecurity.  
The success of the catching-up process depends very much on how freely and 
fast the entry of new firms, on the one hand, and exit and restructuring of incumbent 
firms, on the other, evolve65. If a government, instead of enhancing these market-
friendly processes, intervenes with special subsidies, preferential taxation, advantages 
provided in government procurements or credit relief for the businesses of its clients, it 
will obviously reduce the structural and productivity improvement of the economy. 
The clientelist networks are evidently corrupt, where favoritism, political 
partiality, give-and-take, nepotism abound and much of the morale of democracy and 
the logic of the market is destroyed. A clientelist regime is more open to state capture 
by firms supporting the actual political administration, and it is alien to an independent 
judiciary and to a free press. It is strongly interested in maintaining the lack of 
transparency in connection with government activities, the use of public funds, the 
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 On the consolidation of banks see  Várhegyi (2000). 
65
 See in more detail  Aghion and Schankerman (2000). 
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conditions of privatization and state contracts, the tax exemptions and other favors 
given to investors. Consequently, even if scandals are frequent, one can rarely find cases 
of serious and persistent criminal investigations in corruption, embezzlement, misuse of 
public funds, or even in Mafia-type activities. If corruption is not punished, if powerful 
politicians can avoid or stifle prosecution, it is not only ruinous for the rule of law due 
to the impunity of the crimes themselves, but creates public resignation which is 
harmful for the emerging democratic regimes and the development of civic society. 
Ten years’ history of the East Central European societies revealed that political 
freedom, pluralism and democratic elections are not sufficient in themselves to evolve a 
dynamic political equilibrium with the necessary mechanisms of checks and balances. If 
clientelist networks develop, for example, in a two-party system, then following the 
electoral campaigns the adversaries can cooperate in illegal deals, as both of them know 
enough “dirt” on the other to feel safe. The “dirt collection mechanism” — as Kaminski 
(2001) aptly called it — works not only among political parties, but also in the selection 
of the officers, or the staff of authorities: to trust someone, one must have “dirt” on him 
or her. Such a political cooperation is also a system of checks and balances, but it is 
based on mutual concealing and leniency of the shames and crimes. If it is combined 
with limitation of the freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary, it can 
be very damaging for the development of a truly democratic system. 
Politically disruptive clientelist regimes are disadvantageous for the extension 
and empowering of the market forces and for economic growth. If the choice between 
the privatization offers, state contracts, tenders etc. is politically motivated, and clients 
are offered inside information and are favored, the best offer will rarely win. In 
clientelist rule, an impartial and honest professional civil service, which is guided only 
by the law and the public interest, can not develop. But it can use very well the officials, 
judges, journalists, police officers, inherited from the communist regime, who have 
learned to obey politicians by all means and to implement laws to suit their bosses’ 
whims. In such conditions, the administration likes to extend secrecy of government’s 
dealings beyond all limits, following the tradition of the paranoid non-disclosure in the 
communist regimes.  
 
4. Summary and conclusions  
Since institutions include not only governmental and civic organizations and 
regulations, but also social customs and behavior, the latter being strongly imbedded in 
the society, the post-transition development can not be analyzed or understood without 
the heritage of the past. All-encompassing state-ownership, monopolization and 
elimination of all kinds of competition reached unprecedented proportions in the Soviet-
type economies, creating oligarchic organizations, mentalities, and behavioral patterns. 
The ruling communist elite enjoyed extreme privileges and was beyond the rule of the 
law; corruption gradually became widespread and generally unpunished. In these 
dictatorial regimes, especially where communist power was combined with military 
occupation and foreign oppression, citizens became much more alienated from the state 
and its regulations than in democratic societies. This heritage in both the organizational 
and the behavioral patterns will take a long time to change, and strongly influences the 
institutions emerging in the new democratic market-economy systems.  
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Recent experiences in the catching-up process of the fastest growing countries 
could not be explained without taking into consideration the quality of governance — 
including both institutions and economic policy. The fastest growing economies — 
among both the developing and the South-European countries — proved that by 
reforming the institutional system and the policy-regimes, the growth potential can be 
much better exploited and the catching-up can be fast. 
In the last ten years, several of the countries belonging to the first wave of EU 
accession practically finished their transition: they are now stable democracies with 
sufficiently well-functioning market institutions, and have started to grow faster than the 
average of the EU countries. Their relatively low wage-level contributed significantly to 
the attraction of foreign investments and to the successes of export growth, the two most 
important factors promoting their recovery. Institutional changes, such as privatization, 
the liberalization of trade and capital flows were important factors of structural change, 
a necessary condition of economic growth. However, there is a lot to learn from the 
social compromise of the West European countries and of the role of the governments in 
co-coordinating and keeping the agreements of the social partners. The hardships of 
structural change and foreign competition may strengthen populist and protectionist 
tendencies and wage pressures, may rouse anti-European, or anti-globalization passions 
which can become serious obstacles to faster growth and catching-up. 
With the “velvet” character of systemic change, the transition did not destroy 
many of the previous special interest organizations that create obstacles to faster growth 
and structural change. With the inflow of foreign capital and the growing role of 
multinational firms, powerful new lobbies and pressure groups emerged and started to 
influence legislation and economic policies, occupy and monopolies the local markets 
and exclude competition. The governments were not prepared to resist such 
monopolization tendencies, antitrust legislation was lacking, and it took time to develop 
institutions defending consumers’ interests.  
The great variation in the economic performance of the transition countries was 
in significant part due to the inherited initial conditions. The path they followed 
depended heavily on the policies they have chosen, but this choice was strongly 
influenced by the past also. Adverse initial conditions were associated with slower 
economic liberalization; however, once the reforms were implemented, their  
effectiveness was not impeded. It is remarkable that the influence of initial conditions 
diminished and the importance of institution creation increased over time.  
There is a wide consensus that sustainable economic growth and the attainment 
of prosperity depends in great part on the institutional framework of the rule of law and 
property rights protection, since these are indispensable to the efficient working of the 
markets. However, changes of such magnitude that took place of East Central Europe 
— like the creation of markets, privatization, restructuring, enforcement of property 
rights — need to be managed without excessive disturbances, otherwise the political 
support of reforms can not be  maintained. This involves a great deal of uncertainty; 
therefore, the process of institution building must integrate the risks concerning the 
outcomes and the learning-by-doing character of the reforms. 
Early and fast trade liberalization was one of the success stories in the East 
Central European transition countries. Still, as protectionist thinking and practice has 
prevailed for a long time, starting more than a century ago when many of the nation-
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states were created in the region, a retreat from the openness of these economies — 
which is clamored for over and over again both by domestic business organizations and 
foreign investors — would be extremely dangerous from the point of view of growth 
and  EU accession. 
Experience has shown that the catching-up of smaller transition countries 
depends on their integration into the global economy and consequently on how their 
relations with foreign investors and multinational companies are developing. Foreign 
investments are much needed in these economies because of the shortage of local 
capital, of the huge technological gap and lack of managerial skills. On the other hand, 
selling state assets to foreigners is against the interests of domestic investors (including 
the influential clients of the ruling political parties), who are in many instances unable 
to compete with their foreign rivals. The outcome of this economic power struggle is 
decisive for the catching-up process, as it became evident that the more open the 
transition countries were to foreign investments, the faster the  restructuring in 
production was carried out and higher export growth was achieved  following the 
decline of their output in the early 1990s. 
While liberalization of trade and capital flows are vital conditions of catching-up, 
one should not forget — as Abramovitz (1986) reminded us — that these are basically 
endogenous processes. Even if much depends on the openness and the changing 
external conditions of an economy, its performance is basically determined by the 
allocation of resources and their efficient use influenced by the evolution of the 
institutional structure. 
The general breakdown of the rule of law and increased criminality were 
unexpected consequences of the collapse of communist rule. It was the consequence of 
liberation from dictatorship and police state and the expression of the alienation of the 
citizens from the totalitarian state. However, the lack or weakness of the rule of the law 
is one of the main obstacles to the economic catching-up of the East Central European 
societies and their accession to the European Union. 
The share of the shadow economy in the transition countries increased very 
substantially in the first period of transition and is now about twice as big as in 
developed market economies. When both production and state control suddenly 
declined, firms tried to avoid bankruptcies by going underground. While large-scale tax-
avoidance is closely related to corruption and the decline of the rule of law, their effect 
on economic growth is not obviously negative. In contrast, the significant increase in 
criminal activity is very damaging for the lawful and secure environment of growth.  
Even if measurement of corruption is very difficult, all investigations found a 
relatively high level of it in the transition countries. Corruption is generally  found to be 
strongly negatively associated with the investment rate, and this is the main channel 
through which it lowers the rate of growth. Corruption usually helps tax-avoidance, and 
reduces public income and expenditures, including public investments. Public 
procurement contracts in a corrupt environment lead to exaggerated costs of 
construction, lower productivity, inferior services, and poor quality. All of these are 
very harmful for economic growth, especially in the transition countries where 
infrastructural investments were strongly neglected during the communist period. 
The danger for the rule of law is even greater when firms can influence the 
formation of laws and regulations through illicit private payments to public officials or 
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legislators than when they can circumvent them by going underground or by bribery. In 
several cases it could be observed in the transition process that powerful firms could 
collude with public officials to extract rents through manipulation of state power, i.e. the 
capture of the state.  
At the time of the democratic change in the East Central European countries 
practically all political parties agreed on the necessity of privatization and the creation 
of a “new middle class”, which was in many cases an euphemism for the capitalist class. 
In the early stage of the political struggle, the question was not only which political 
group would govern the country, but also who would privatize the vast quantity of state 
assets, and to whom. Clientelistic networks evolved around the political parties, creating 
a social network where political loyalty prevails against market relations, democratic 
decision making, and professionalism in public administration. Clientelism is different 
from individual corruption: it is a form of corrupt social organization and group-
behavior offering members of the clientele high public service positions without the 
necessary qualifications, and also opportunities to participate in the privatization 
process with favorable conditions.  
In politically disruptive clientelist regimes corruption, favoritism, partiality, 
give-and-take, and nepotism abound, and thus democratic morale and the logic of the 
market is destroyed. All this is obviously very harmful for the extension and 
empowering of the market forces, for economic growth and for the development of an 
impartial and honest professional civil service guided only by law and the  interest of 
the public. 
This paper concentrated on how institutional development in the East Central 
European countries contributes to and hinders the catching-up process of future EU 
members. The essence of what comes out of this analysis is that the institutions in place 
in most of these countries are suitable to achieve a faster growth rate than the EU 
average. Consequently, the catching-up in the not too distant future seems very probable 
after accession. However, the deficiencies in the rule of the law are seriously hindering 
the full utilization of the growth potential of these economies. Therefore, very much 
depends on when and to what degree the rule of law and the credibility of  governments 
in this respect can and will be restored. 
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